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 Narrative Reform Dilemmas 
Mariela Olivares* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The way in which we tell our stories and describe our characters sets the 
foundation for how our audience perceives the story.  Depending on the narra-
tor’s choices, our protagonist may be a hero against the wrongs of an unjust 
authoritarian system – or a terrorist working against a legitimate government.  
Nelson Mandela, even as a former President of South Africa, was on a U.S. 
government terror watch list until as late as 2008 and could not enter the coun-
try without a dispensation of U.S. immigration policies.1  The U.S. government 
prohibited his entry as a communist sympathizer who fought against the once-
recognized South African leadership.2  Only with the wisdom of time and po-
litical awakening did the world fully recognize that Mandela fought for free-
dom against the apartheid regime and that his resistance against the govern-
ment was just.  Prior to this realization, however, Mandela was characterized 
in many popular media outlets of the time as a communist and terrorist leader 
of the revolutionary African National Congress (“ANC”) South African party.3 
Though the passage of time may influence narrative choices, changes in 
rhetoric can have concomitant influence on political movements.  For example, 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; LL.M., Georgetown 
University Law Center; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., University of 
Texas at Austin.  I am very grateful for the thoughtful and insightful comments of Stew-
art Chang, Kevin R. Johnson, Elizabeth Keyes, Karla McKanders and participants at 
presentations at the Howard University School of Law and the 2016 Law & Society 
Conference.  I dedicate this Article to my parents, José and Tomacita, and to my daugh-
ters, Amalia and Alena. 
 1. See Caitlin Dewey, Why Nelson Mandela Was on a Terrorism Watch List in 
2008, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2013/12/07/why-nelson-mandela-was-on-a-terrorism-watch-list-in-2008/ 
(“The Reagan administration also followed South Africa’s lead on characterizing the 
ANC, naming it a terrorist group in the 1970s and forcing Mandela to get special State 
Department clearance to enter the U.S. in 2008.  (‘It’s frankly a rather embarrassing 
matter,’ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said at the time.)”).   
 2. See id. 
 3. See id.; Robert Windrem, US Government Considered Nelson Mandela a Ter-
rorist Until 2008, NBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2013, 4:55 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/us-government-considered-nelson-mandela-ter-
rorist-until-2008-f2D11708787.  Indeed, some news outlets continued to paint Mandela 
in this light after his death.  See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, Remembering Mandela, 
Without Rose-Colored Glasses, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 14, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.na-
tionalreview.com/article/366317/remembering-mandela-without-rose-colored-
glasses-andrew-c-mccarthy (“Still, while high-wattage fawning was to be expected in 
the mainstream media [upon Mandela’s death], the conservative press, too, tripped over 
itself to praise Mandela.  That was disheartening.”).  
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as this Article explores, the popular vilification of immigrants in the United 
States has negatively influenced the societal and political environment against 
immigrants.  I discuss the power of narrative and outline ways in which advo-
cates use this power to influence social and political opinion to effectuate legal 
reform.  Importantly, however, I caution that advocates must be wary about 
reifying one community of people to the demonization of another. 
To juxtapose this approach using another contemporary example, I dis-
cuss the advocacy that eventually secured marriage equality rights for gay peo-
ple in the United States as a case study for the power of narrative to achieve 
civil rights gains.  When the U.S. Supreme Court decided the landmark case of 
Obergefell v. Hodges4 in June 2015, a broad coalition of gay rights advocates 
and supporters celebrated the decision that provided same-sex couples with the 
same rights to marry as heterosexual people.5  Yet, upon reflection on the lan-
guage and tenor of the opinion, I wondered to what extent the opinion’s exul-
tation of the marriage institution would eventually harm the rights of other 
communities and families who did not seek marriage.  This case study explores 
how the narrative of the Obergefell opinion builds upon and solidifies the pri-
macy of the American marriage to the ongoing detriment of a non-traditional 
family structure and of an individual’s choice to eschew the government-spon-
sored marriage institution.  Although this fealty to marriage is not surprising in 
the context of civil rights advancement of marriage equality, the marriage nar-
rative also demeans those who do not fit within its traditional purview. 
Consequently, I challenge the advocacy strategy that builds support for 
equality movements by using a traditional normative context – like the heter-
onormative narrative that sought to normalize gay marriage by drawing com-
parisons to traditional family structures but which ultimately results in the den-
igration of those residing outside these contextual boundaries.  Analogously, 
then, advocates cannot simply replace one narrative with another in the fight 
for immigrant rights and equality.  Instead, reforming the narrative must be 
strategic and informed. 
This Article proceeds in the following way.  Part II lays an important 
foundation in understanding the historical context of public and political per-
ceptions in immigration law and policy.  Although there have been periods of 
relative acceptance of immigrants – including through legislative reforms in 
the 1980s that  provided legalization to millions of undocumented agricultural 
workers – more contemporary rhetoric has returned to an environment over-
whelmed by vitriol and scapegoating against immigrant communities.6  More-
 
 4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. See Brian McBride, Four Cases That Paved the Way for Marriage Equality 
and a Reminder of the Work Ahead, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.hrc.org/blog/four-cases-that-paved-the-way-for-marriage-equality-and-a-
reminder-of-the-w. 
 6. See Peter J. Duignan, Making and Remaking America: Immigration into the 
United States, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.hoover.org/re-
search/making-and-remaking-america-immigration-united-states. 
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over, animosity against immigrants has historically and contemporarily in-
cluded discriminatory and racist policies and laws that consistently target or 
implicitly affect immigrants of color.  Thus, Part II frames the historical dis-
cussion as one of racial and ethnic subordination, particularly against Black 
and Latino/a immigrants, and comments on how the negative narrative against 
such communities has emerged. 
To consider how to turn this tide of harmful rhetoric, Part III provides an 
analogous illustration.  As an example of how civil rights equality movements 
have successfully reframed a contentious debate, I discuss the marriage equal-
ity movement.  The same-sex marriage debate and the fight for equality for gay 
people represent a useful example of how advocates created a tidal shift in the 
ways in which the larger society perceived gay people and their demands for 
equality.  Through this brief historical discussion, Part III describes the gay-
rights movement, from a time in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld crimi-
nalization of same-sex sodomy in 19867 to the 2015 Obergefell decision in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court lauded the gay community and upheld same-
sex marriage as a fundamental right.8  Within this success, however, Part III 
introduces the concomitant effects that the advocacy strategy that sought to 
normalize gay people and their quest for marriage equality could have upon 
others who do not fit this normative rhetorical ideal.  This is an important foun-
dational discussion for Parts IV and V. 
Part IV comments on this advocacy strategy of normalizing narrative in 
the immigrants’ rights movement.  Using legislative and political movements 
that have garnered relative widespread support (even if not ultimately or yet 
successful), one can glean lessons from the DREAM Act,9 the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program,10 and the advocacy efforts on be-
 
 7. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–96 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s anti-
sodomy law by reasoning that there was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy), 
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 9. The Dream Act of 2017, introduced to Congress on July 20, 2017, failed to 
pass.  See Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115th Cong. (2017); Dream Act of 2017, H.R. 
3440, 115th Cong. (2017).  DREAM stands for Development, Relief, and Education 
for Alien Minors. 
 10. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-de-
ferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Dec. 29, 2017). At the time of pub-
lication, there is profound volatility in the political climate surrounding DACA reform, 
including a 2018 shutdown of the federal government due, in large part, to certain Dem-
ocrats withholding their support for a spending bill without renewed protections for 
DACA recipients after the Trump Administration decided to end DACA. Sean Sulli-
van, Ed O’Keefe and Elise Viebeck, Shutdown Ends After Democrats Agree to Trust 
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half of  unaccompanied immigrant minors.  Using a framework of the vulner-
able or helpless “good” immigrant has been a common and somewhat success-
ful tool in reframing the debate in immigration reform.  For example, although 
there was and is still considerable vehement opposition against undocumented 
immigrant children and families remaining and gaining lawful status in the 
United States,11 there was a marked shift in rhetoric when high numbers of 
Central American unaccompanied children and mothers with their children ar-
rived in the United States fleeing violence in their home countries in 2014.12  It 
seemed as if the arrival of perhaps the most vulnerable of immigrants sparked 
a measure of compassion and humanitarianism that had not previously been 
the norm.  Part IV discusses the power of narrative in immigration equality 
strategies but notes that past efforts have resulted in incomplete successes. 
Part V warns that strategies relying upon the normalization of immigrants 
will result in the same effects as in the same-sex marriage debate.  Just as pri-
oritizing the marriage institution has effects on those who eschew the tradi-
tional marriage norm, touting the worthiness of seemingly vulnerable immi-
grants will have effects on other immigrants who do not fit the archetype.  In 
this sense, the role of the advocate for immigrant equality must be cognizant 
of the resulting dilemma in achieving results for one group, only to increase 
the burden on another.  Indeed, the immigration law and policy consequences 
of demonizing one community to uplift another will lead to serious and irre-
versible consequences for the ostracized group.  Finally, critical legal scholars 
teach that meaningful gains towards civil rights equality must pay heed to the 
dominant political majority, who condones reform only when it is in its own 
interests.  This Article concludes by acknowledging these conflicts and reali-
ties, while encouraging advocates to create a politically viable narrative that 
capitalizes on the invigorated public consciousness about immigrant inequal-
ity.  Although I am unsure of the ultimate successful narrative strategies, the 
aim of this Article is to engage advocates and political communities in strategic 
and productive conversations that will advance the immigrant justice move-
ment. 
II.  SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE IMMIGRATION RHETORIC 
The societal and political perception of immigrants’ presence in the 
United States has gone through permutations spanning the spectrum of early 
inclusiveness to vehement opposition.  Indeed, in our country’s earliest history, 
 
 11. See Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering & 
Immigration Detention, 94 NEB. L. REV. 963, 997 (2016) [hereinafter Olivares, Inter-
sectionality at the Intersection] (focusing on the rhetoric labeling “immigrants as crim-
inal lawbreakers who will steal free education, public benefits and healthcare, and infest 
schools . . . with disease” (footnotes omitted)). 
 12. Id. at 997–98 (highlighting some of the grounds for asylum that the immigrant 
women sought, including fleeing persecution from domestic and gang violence and 
sexual abuse).  Yet, as also noted, there were protests and angry rhetoric aimed at the 
mothers and children.  Id. 
4
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there was no formalized immigration law but instead a largely unregulated re-
gime of open borders.13  In the late eighteenth century, states began to legislate 
about topics surrounding migration, which prompted the nascent federal gov-
ernment to recognize the problematic system of allowing each state to make its 
own rules regarding the migration of people.14  What resulted were the federal 
government’s efforts to regularize immigration law and policy through com-
mon law decisions and eventual legislation.  These earliest years of federal 
immigration power represent the seeds of congressional plenary power, the 
broad, all-encompassing power of the federal government to regulate immigra-
tion law.15 
 
 13. Overview of INS History: Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-his-
tory/agency-history/early-american-immigration-policies (last updated Sept. 4, 2015) 
(“Americans encouraged relatively free and open immigration during the 18th and early 
19th centuries, and rarely questioned that policy until the late 1800s.”); see also Paul 
Finkelman, Coping with a New “Yellow Peril”: Japanese Immigration, the Gentle-
men’s Agreement, and the Coming of World War II, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 1409, 1414 
(2015) (noting that, in the 1600–1800s and through the time of the American Revolu-
tion, the voluntary and heavily-encouraged immigration of mostly Protestants “from 
Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland), and . . . . many people of Dutch 
ancestry in what became New York.  The largest non-British immigration was from 
Germany”).  These numbers do not note the forced migration in the American slave 
trade.  See id. at 1414 n.26 (discussing the data from the Trans-Atlantic slave trade).  
Indeed, as Finkelman further writes, even the earliest settlers and colonizers in the 
United States complained about the effects of immigrants, noting that “as early as 1642, 
authorities in the Plymouth colony blamed social problems on unwanted immigrants: 
in [one documented] case, a fellow Englishman whose religious convictions and per-
sonal behavior were not exactly in tune with the founders of the colony.”  Id. at 1413. 
 14. See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (holding that a state 
tax on emigrant steamship passengers was inappropriate because such matters fall un-
der the powers of Congress); The Head-Money Cases, 18 F. 135, 138–39 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1883) (upholding taxes on incoming noncitizen passengers as exercise 
of Congress’ interstate commerce power), aff’d, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); see also Finkel-
man, supra note 13, at 1415–17 & n.45 (discussing how states openly regulated migra-
tion until about 1849 when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Massachusetts and 
New York immigration-related statutes as a violation of Congress’s dormant powers in 
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849)).  As noted, this discussion regarding interstate 
commerce and the parallel restrictions regarding taxing incoming international passen-
gers did not encompass the slave trade.  Indeed, at the time of the slave trade, the dis-
cussion in the courts often centered on whether the Constitution could interfere with 
states’ rights with regards to slavery.  Justice Daniel Webster, for example, famously 
declared that “the Constitution recognized slaves as property, and as such they fell un-
der the commerce clause,” thereby equating slaves as any other property.  See Kirk 
Scott, The Two-Edged Sword: Slavery and the Commerce Clause, 1837–1852, 2 
FAIRMOUNT FOLIO 41, 44 (1998). 
 15. Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 967–69; see 
also Rose Cuison Villazor, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: Immigration as Property, 
68 OKLA. L. REV. 137, 156 (2015) (speculating that had Chae Chan Ping’s property 
rights argument swayed the Court, the plenary power doctrine would not have the same 
5
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Within the establishment of these broad powers, the law was explicitly 
and pointedly discriminatory against immigrants of color, reflecting the gen-
eral racist political and societal climate of the time.16  As one of the most no-
torious examples, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which restricted the immigration of 
Chinese immigrants to the United States.17  In the early 1800s, there was rela-
tively minimal immigration from China, but the number of Chinese immigrants 
surged towards the end of the 1800s as labor shortages hindered the growing 
American industrial economy, prompting efforts to bring Chinese laborers.18  
As the numbers of Chinese immigrants increased in the United States, and as 
they began to compete with U.S. citizens for jobs and assert themselves more 
permanently in U.S. cities and communities, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
in Chae Chan Ping, “the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, 
was followed, in many cases, by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the 
public peace.”19  Thus, the Court upheld the federal Chinese Exclusion Act, in 
part because the “presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the 
material interests of the state, and upon public morals; . . . their immigration 
was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a 
menace to our civilization.”20 
Building upon the rhetoric of the Chinese Exclusion Act, immigration law 
and policy continued to target immigrants of color, including Asian, Latino/a, 
and African immigrants and other members of the “Black race” throughout the 
 
scope that it does today); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration 
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1625, 1628 (1992) (asserting that procedural due process has substituted for judicial 
review in the development of immigration law and the plenary power doctrine). 
 16. I have written about the discriminatory history of immigration law along racial 
and ethnic lines.  See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 
964–70.  This section uses information from and builds upon that previous work. 
 17. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).  For a more thor-
ough discussion of this history, see Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra 
note 11, at 1006–07. 
 18.  See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 1006–07; 
see also Finkelman, supra note 13, at 1423 (“While entrepreneurs and railroad execu-
tives in California welcomed this source of cheap [Chinese] labor, the vast majority of 
Californians and Oregonians came to resent the presence of these apparently strange 
people whose culture, language, religion, dress, hair style, food – and most of all phys-
ical appearance – were so alien to most Americans.”); Lakshmi Gandhi, A History of 
Indentured Labor Gives ‘Coolie’ Its Sting, NPR (Nov. 25, 2013, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/11/25/247166284/a-history-of-inden-
tured-labor-gives-coolie-its-sting (explaining the origin of the pejorative term “coolie” 
to denote Chinese immigrants employed in the American railroad industry); Immigra-
tion, Railroads, and the West, HARV. U. LIBR. OPEN COLLECTIONS PROGRAM, 
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/railroads.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (de-
scribing immigrants’ work on American railroads between 1789 and 1930). 
 19. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. 
 20. Id. 
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nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, while protecting immigration of 
white people from western and northern Europe.21  The explicit preference for 
northern European and other white immigrants continued through much of the 
twentieth century.22  With the belief that white immigrants would more easily 
assimilate into a dominant “American” culture,23 policies regarding immigra-
tion and naturalization were centered on prioritizing white people and ostraciz-
ing immigrants of color.24  These pervasive efforts to keep out immigrants of 
color manifested in various ways, including the targeting of Latino/a immi-
grants, especially Mexicans.25 
As a historical example of an exclusionary program, the Bracero program, 
a result of the agricultural labor shortages created by World War II, began when 
the U.S. government entered into an agreement with the Mexican government 
to send Mexicans to the United States to work on a temporary basis.  The Mex-
icans were largely from impoverished rural towns and sent to the fields, farms 
and cities of the United States to pick fruits and vegetables and to build rail-
roads.26  But after encountering increased racial and ethnic animus and having 
 
 21. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
27 (2006) (noting the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the creation of the 
“Asiatic barred zone” in 1917, a Senate bill excluding “all members of the African or 
black race,” and a quota system designed to limit immigration to western and northern 
Europeans); Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the 
Idea of Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 368 [hereinafter Motomura, 
Who Belongs] (similarly discussing the racialized history of the laws); Kevin R. John-
son, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” 
into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120, 1127–30 (1998) [hereinafter John-
son, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations]. 
 22. See Motomura, Who Belongs, supra note 21, at 369–71; Johnson, Race, the 
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 21, at 1129–30 (recog-
nizing that the national origins quota system was designed to preserve the traditional 
cultural and sociological balance of the United States); LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 27–28 
(stating that the restriction on immigration to the United States on the basis of race 
lasted from the 1880s until 1965). 
 23. See Motomura, Who Belongs, supra note 21, at 369 (discussing the connection 
between racial restrictions and naturalization and the ways in which these restrictions 
evinced a political understanding that white immigrants would easily assimilate, inte-
grate and ultimately choose to be U.S. citizens). 
 24. See id.; Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, 
supra note 21, at 1121; LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 27. 
 25. Immigrants from Mexico have long constituted the largest group of Latino/a 
immigrants in the United States, comprising 26.9% of all immigrants in 2015 – far 
above El Salvador, the nation with the second largest total group of Latino/a immigrants 
in the United States at 3.1%.  See Largest U.S. Immigrant Groups over Time, 1960–
Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-
hub/charts/largest-immigrant-groups-over-time (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (presenting 
the United States’ immigrant population as a moving pie chart relevant to the country 
of origin up to 2015). 
 26. See Ediberto Román, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 878–79 
(2008). 
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received temporary lawful status for the sole purpose of providing cheap labor, 
millions of Mexican immigrants and others of Mexican ancestry were forcibly 
removed during the program’s operation and at the program’s end in 1965.27  
Many of those deported were actually U.S. citizens.28 
Inherent in the phenomenon of mass removal and deportation, like in the 
Bracero program, was the targeting immigrants of color and other minorities: 
Because the immigrant is Asian, Latino/a or (more commonly now) Muslim, 
societal and political rhetoric ostracizes the community.  Bill Hing labels this 
process “de-Americanization,” which excludes the minority-other due to xen-
ophobia, masquerading as patriotism: 
Certainly, de-Americanization is a process that involves racism, but . . 
. de-Americanizers base their assault on loyalty and foreignness.  In the 
minds of the private actors, who are nothing more than lawless vigilan-
tes, self-appointed enforcers of true Americanism, their victims are im-
migrants or foreigners even though they may in fact be citizens by birth 
or through naturalization.  Irrespective of the victim community’s pos-
sible longstanding status in the country, its members are regarded as 
 
 27. LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 27–28 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 10 (1990)) (suggest-
ing that the mass deportation of approximately 500,000 Mexican immigrants was 
spurned by the economic distress of the Great Depression); see also Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the 
“War on Terror”, 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2005) (noting that up to one million people 
were removed); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination 
in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 621–22 (2015) (discussing the repat-
riation of Mexican immigrants and their forcible removal during “Operation Wetback,” 
which began in 1954).  Vázquez also writes about the racialized and oppressive mech-
anisms at work in the temporary immigration labor provisions that targeted Mexican 
immigrants during this time: 
 
Temporary worker programs ensured that Latinos remained temporary and 
marginalized . . . . Latinos were tied to their employer, they were tied to a spe-
cific occupation, wages were low, and they could not remain permanently in 
the United States.  Furthermore, they could not bring their spouse or children 
as such actions might cause them to try to reside permanently in the country. 
 
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted); see Motomura, Who Belongs, supra note 21, at 370; S. 
POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (2013), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/down-
loads/publication/SPLC-Close-to-Slavery-2013.pdf (explaining that World War I 
brought migration from Europe largely to a halt and created a greater demand for Mex-
ican labor. In the Great Depression, Mexican workers were seen as a threat to American 
jobs, leading to their forcible deportation). 
 28. See LÓPEZ, supra note 21, at 27; Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and 
Domestic Race Relations, supra note 21, at 1117. 
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perpetual foreigners.  The victim community is forever regarded as im-
migrant America, as opposed to simply part of America and its diver-
sity.29 
Thus, as a case study of this de-Americanization process, the deportations of 
Mexicans (and Mexican-Americans) as part of the Bracero program were not 
just due to the labor and economic environment of the time.  Rather, these mass 
deportations occurred because Americans did not perceive the Mexican laborer 
as an acceptable member of the American citizenship.  Moreover, Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans were not considered to be worthy of future American 
citizenship.  Hiroshi Motomura, for example, describes this aspirational citizen 
as an “American in waiting.”30  In that description, the immigrant arrives to the 
United States to make his or her life and pursue the quintessential American 
dream – achieving along the way the markers of American assimilation, like 
language, employment, education and familial stability.31  Those immigrants 
occupy a type of regularized middle ground, which comes with some measure 
of belonging and inclusion by the larger American society.  These almost-
Americans embody the narrative of the industrious and/or educated, skilled or 
exceptionally talented immigrant that U.S. society seeks and even sometimes 
embraces.32 
In contrast, immigrants who came to perform lower-skilled laborer jobs – 
like the Chinese railroad laborers and the Mexican Bracero workers – were 
perceived as un-American and perpetual outsiders to American society, who 
were simply here to do the hard jobs that Americans did not want.  Thus, the 
path to the temporary Bracero program was smoothed not just because of the 
dire labor shortages at the time but because the Mexican immigrant was per-
ceived as a servile peon and/or as a less-than-human savage, who could per-
form hard labor while not challenging the authority of his or her American 
boss.33  As Deborah Weissman writes, the vitriolic and negative stereotyping 
 
 29. Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant 
America, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 443–44 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 30. Motomura, Who Belongs, supra note 21, at 363. 
 31. Id. at 360–61 (introducing the term “Americans in waiting” to refer to immi-
grants in the United States who hope to become legal citizens of the country). 
 32. In addition to the goals of family unification or reunification, immigration law 
prioritizes attracting highly-skilled immigrants or those who will perform certain jobs 
and tasks that not enough Americans will perform.  Mariela Olivares, Renewing the 
Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79, 83 
(2013) [hereinafter Olivares, Renewing the Dream] (asserting the desirability and pri-
oritization of certain immigrants over others, mainly those who have attained higher 
education or specialized skills). 
 33. See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, Anglo Views of Mexican Labor: Shaping the 
Law of Temporary Work Through Masculinities Narratives, 13 NEV. L. J. 547, 551–52 
(2013) (discussing the legislative debates at the time to create and enforce the Bracero 
program, with legislators stating, for example, “In a dialogue during a congressional 
hearing on importing seasonal workers from Mexico, Congressman Adolph Sabath ob-
served that Mexicans could ‘bend better’ than other workers.  Congressman Adam 
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of the Mexican immigrant has deep roots in U.S. history, beginning at least in 
the nineteenth century, when Americans described Mexican immigrants as 
“earless and heartless creatures, semi-barbarians, . . . uneducated and grossly 
ignorant . . . . They [were] lynched for being too Mexican, and harassed for 
speaking their native language or otherwise expressing their culture.”34 
Importantly, the broad societal perceptions of the immigrant-other carry 
over into the enactment of immigration law, which has an undeniable and clear 
history of racial, ethnic and class discrimination.  Or, as Kevin Johnson ex-
pertly summarizes: “At bottom, U.S. immigration law historically has operated 
– and continues to operate – to prevent many poor and working noncitizens of 
color from migrating to, and harshly treating those living in, the United 
States.”35  In this instance, the mass deportations and removals at the end of the 
Bracero program coincided with and were fueled by Americans’ perceptions 
that the Mexican population in the United States was getting too large, and thus 
Mexicans needed to be removed and prohibited from continuing to immi-
grate.36  By 1959, for example, over 450,000 Mexicans were part of the Bracero 
program and, in total, more than 5 million Mexicans came to the United States 
to work, a migration that had demographic and cultural effects on the states in 
which they settled.37  Moreover, this Cold War period marked a time of height-
ened fear of foreigners generally, who were equated with possible spies or en-
emies of the State.38 
 
Smith responded, ‘Not only can they do it better than anybody else, but there is scarcely 
any other work they can do as successfully.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 34. Deborah Weissman, The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of 
Mexican Criminality, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 141, 145 (2015) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Laura E. Gómez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: 
Mexican Elites and the Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mex-
ico, in “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”: HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN LAWYERING 1, 23 (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006)  
(describing the white American strategy in the late nineteenth century to afford elite 
Mexican-Americans (or Mexicans in later U.S. territories) superior status to native In-
dians even though, in reality, “American writers, newspapermen, and politicians had 
denounced Mexicans as racially inferior and unfit to govern themselves or join the Un-
ion”). 
 35. Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration 
Law and Enforcement, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Race and Class]. 
 36. Román, supra note 26, at 878–79. 
 37. See id.; see generally Daniel Martínez, The Impact of the Bracero Programs 
on a Southern California Mexican-American Community (May 17, 1958) (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with Bracero History Archive, Item 
No. 3184) (providing the background of the Bracero program while focusing on a small 
town in California that was impacted by the program) (available at http://braceroar-
chive.org/archive/files/danielmartinezthesis_d24a05a438.pdf).   Martínez discusses the 
tensions between the Anglo Californians in the town of Northtown and the Mexican 
Braceros who lived in Cucamonga, a worksite town.  See id. 
 38. See Román, supra note 26, at 880. 
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Thus, the rhetoric regarding the immigration and eventual settlement of 
Mexicans in the United States provides one example of the way in which im-
migration law concentrated on othering immigrants of color so as to dehuman-
ize and exploit them.  As Leticia Saucedo notes about this historical period, 
“[T]he narratives of the Mexican problem and the racialized, inferior Mexican 
followed Mexican migrants into the U.S.” and continued throughout the twen-
tieth century.39  The narrative surrounding the immigrant-other goes hand in 
hand with important legislative effects, like the mass deportations of Braceros 
and, contemporarily, the ongoing anti-immigrant animus driving legislative 
changes. 
In short, societal perception and concomitant legislative processes jointly 
operate to systemically paint the immigrant of color as an outsider.  Each in-
forming and fueling the other, it becomes easier to legislate against immigrant 
inclusion when the immigrant is seen as un-American.40  Indeed, the deep in-
terconnectedness between law and societal trends is a hallmark of immigration 
law.  As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals famously remarked, immigration 
law and the laws therein regarding the exclusion or expulsion of noncitizens 
are like a “magic mirror, reflecting the fears and concerns of past Con-
gresses.”41  In this sense, then, when public sentiment turns to animus against 
immigrants, the consequences are not limited to social divisiveness but also 
lead to actual legislative enactments limiting the immigration of certain groups 
of people, including people of color and other marginalized populations. 
Indeed, Mexican immigrants suffered the same indignities as many im-
migrants of color through these explicit and implicit racist and discriminatory 
laws and policies.  Although the Immigration Act of 1965 repealed the national 
origin quota system (which had effectively prohibited the immigration of peo-
ple of color) and incorporated race-neutral language for the first time,42 by that 
time, immigration law and policy had condemned immigrants of color in such 
 
 39. Leticia M. Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, Cultural Narratives, and National 
Origin, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 315 (2012) [hereinafter Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants]. 
 40. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 29, at 444 (describing the de-Americanization pro-
cess as two-fold: “(1) the actions of private individuals and (2) official government-
sanctioned actions.  On the private side, the process involves identifying the victims as 
foreigners, sometimes mistakenly, other times simply treating the person as a foreigner 
knowing otherwise . . . . The official side of the process involves laws or enforcement 
strategies that broadly focus on the entire group either without adequate basis or at least 
in an overly-broad manner”). 
 41. Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 
1975); see also Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, 
supra note 21, at 1119–47 (discussing the history of discriminatory practices and laws 
in immigration law and policy). 
 42. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Johnson, 
Race and Class, supra note 35, at 2–3 (adding that the 1960s Civil Rights Movement 
led to the elimination of the quota system in the 1965 Immigration Act amendments); 
Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 21, at 
1131–32 (same). 
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oppressive ways that the discriminatory effects continued.43  Moreover, the end 
of the national origin quota changed the demographic makeup of the country 
and of the immigrant population, most notably by increasing the numbers of 
Asian and Latino/a immigrants.44  At that point, then – confronted with marked 
demographic and cultural shifts – the discriminatory foundations of immigra-
tion law and policy became more implicit and facially neutral.  Yolanda 
Vázquez asserts, for example, that Congress continues to exercise its plenary 
power to uphold racially discriminatory immigration laws “on the basis of na-
tional security and absolute sovereign power.”45  Similarly, as proxies to ra-
cially motivated discrimination, other laws and policy provisions credit the 
protection of American jobs from immigrant competition and of American cit-
ies and towns from supposed alien criminal threats. 
Examples of these laws and policies abound both in the historical record 
and in contemporary times.  For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1965 restricted the number of people who could migrate from the Western 
Hemisphere to only 120,000 individuals per year.46  The emphasis of this par-
ticular limitation was purposeful as “part of a compromise to those who feared 
a drastic upswing in Latin American immigration.  Consequently, Congress 
coupled more generous treatment of those outside the Western Hemisphere 
 
 43. This portion of the Article draws heavily from my previous work regarding 
race and ethnicity intersectionality subordination.  See Olivares, Intersectionality at the 
Intersection, supra note 11, at 1006–15; see also Johnson, Race and Class, supra note 
35, at 2 (exploring the historical connections between race and poverty in anti-immi-
grant legislation, which continued to oppress immigrants after the repeal of the quota 
system). 
 44. See Motomura, Who Belongs, supra note 21, at 369–70; Kevin R. Johnson, 
“Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Non-
persons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 282 (1997). 
 45. Vázquez, supra note 27, at 626. 
 46. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 21(e), 79 Stat. 
911, 921 (1965) (repealed 1976); see also Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and 
Domestic Race Relations, supra note 21, at 1131–32 (noting the immigration limits on 
peoples from the Western Hemisphere after Congress dissolved immigration barriers 
based on race).  Interestingly, as the focus moved away from racial quotas, the 1965 
Immigration Act put new importance on family ties, including an emphasis on families 
through marriage.  See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family 
Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 661–62 (2014) (noting that “[t]he passage of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1965 marked a dramatic shift in U.S. immigration policy. 
The Act . . . focused immigration policy on skills-based immigration and, as relevant 
here, family reunification.  Suddenly, family relationships became the centerpiece not 
only of jus sanguinis citizenship transmission, but also of legal immigration – a change 
that affected vast numbers of people” (footnotes omitted)). 
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with less generous treatment of Latin Americans.”47  Moreover, the Immigra-
tion Act of 1965 and its 1976 Amendments imposed an annual immigration 
limit of 20,000 people from each foreign country,48 which detrimentally and 
disparately affected immigrants of color from certain developing countries, like 
Mexico, the Philippines and India.49  As the ceiling pertained to Mexicans, for 
example, the 20,000-person limit worked to drastically reduce Mexican immi-
gration.50  Further, the fervor against Latino/a immigration in the 1960s and 
into the 1970s (and particularly directed still at Mexicans at this point) was 
strengthened by court decisions, which constitutionally upheld immigration 
checkpoint stops that targeted people based on their “apparent Mexican ances-
try,”51 and a state law provision targeting the employment of undocumented 
Mexicans.52 
 
 47. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra 
note 21, at 1132 (footnote omitted); accord Vázquez, supra note 27, at 630–31 (de-
scribing how the Immigration Act of 1965 “curtailed legal immigration” from Latin 
American countries). 
 48. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 
911, 911–12 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (2012)); see also John-
son, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 21, at 1133 
(noting the various caps Congress has placed on immigration from the developing 
world).  The 1990 Immigration Act altered this quota and instituted a world-wide ceil-
ing of 675,000 immigrants, while also changing the per-country limitations.  See Mi-
chael J. Greenwood & Fred A. Ziel, The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on U.S. 
Immigration, U.C. DAVIS, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/cir/greenwood/com-
bined.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2017).  Moreover, the 1976 Amendments to the Immi-
gration Act repealed the Western Hemisphere restrictions.  Immigration and National-
ity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 2, 90 Stat. 2703, 2703 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012)). 
 49. See Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, su-
pra note 21, at 1133. 
 50. See Vázquez, supra note 27, at 631 & nn.195–96 (citing MAE M. NGAI, 
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 261 
(2004)) (explaining the shift in immigration rates after the 1976 Amendments to the 
Immigration Act: “[I]n the early 1960s, 200,000 Mexicans were admitted under the 
Bracero Program and 35,000 entered as permanent residents each year”). 
 51. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).  In his dissent, 
Justice Brennan argued the illogic of the majority opinion.  Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexi-
can ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that 
they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming characteristics 
of illegal Mexican aliens.”). 
 52. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976), superseded by statute, Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (noting the 
deleterious effects of illegal immigration on working conditions and competitive mar-
kets for Americans and the special problem of California, which enacted the employ-
ment provision: “These local problems are particularly acute in California in light of 
the significant influx into that State of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico”). 
13
Olivares: Narrative Reform Dilemmas
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
1102 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
Interestingly, at this time, there were important and vocal supporters of 
Mexican immigration.  Speaking about the 1976 Amendments to the Immigra-
tion Act that set the new migration ceiling, President Gerald Ford predicted ill-
effects on Mexican migration, noting: 
I am concerned . . . about one aspect of the legislation which has the 
effect of reducing the legal immigration into this country from Mexico.  
Currently about 40,000 natives of Mexico legally immigrate to the 
United States each year.  This legislation would cut that number in 
half.53 
Ford went on to state that he would push for a legislative reform to increase the 
immigration ceiling for Mexicans wishing to immigrate.54  He was not success-
ful, though, in getting any legislation through Congress.  Soon after, in August 
1977, President Jimmy Carter followed through with Ford’s idea and proposed 
legislation to raise the ceiling of numbers of Mexican immigrants who could 
migrate and to establish a legalization program for undocumented immigrants 
already in the United States.55  Congress did not legislate on the proposal, but 
Congress and the Administration created the “Select Commission on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy” to “study and evaluate the existing laws, policies and 
procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees.”56  The Com-
mission eventually gave its report and recommendations to the newly-elected 
President, Ronald Reagan.57 
The Commission reported on the estimated three to five million undocu-
mented immigrants living and working in the United States, which apparently 
struck a chord with the free-market champion, Reagan, who saw the “problem” 
of undocumented migration as one of the corrective power of labor demand.58  
In a 1977 radio address, Reagan drew an analogy for the American people to 
illustrate the importance of regularizing the immigration status of these mil-
lions of migrant workers, stating: 
     It makes one wonder about the illegal alien fuss.  Are great numbers 
of our unemployed really victims of the illegal alien invasion or are 
those illegal tourists actually doing work our own people won’t do?  
One thing is certain in this hungry world: No regulation or law should 
 
 53. Statement on Signing the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1976, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6495 (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Statement on Signing]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Evan Wyloge, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: What It Is, Why It 
Matters, ARIZ. ST. U. NEWS 21 (Nov. 6, 1986), http://asu.news21.com/ar-
chive/2009/the_first_immigration_amnesty/index.html.   
 56. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
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be allowed if it results in crops rotting in the fields for lack of harvest-
ers.59 
With this idea of opening up the labor market for overall American prosperity, 
and as Mexican migration continued, Congress responded with the Immigra-
tion Control and Reform Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which, among other provi-
sions, included sanctions against employers for hiring undocumented work-
ers.60  Senator Alan K. Simpson and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli co-
authored the IRCA bill, the first iteration of which was introduced in 1982 and 
finally passed in 1986 with heavy bipartisan support in both the House and 
Senate.61  Reagan applauded the new legislation and, at its signing, remarked: 
“Future generations of Americans will be thankful for our efforts.”62 
IRCA would continue the immigration law legacy of disproportionally 
negatively affecting immigrants of color and, in this particular case, Mexican 
immigrants.63  Other more recent immigration regulations implicitly targeting 
people of color include federal enforcement efforts like Secure Communities,64 
the purpose of which was to join local law enforcement agencies with Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) so as to catch and deport criminal 
aliens.65  These federal and state efforts use the premise of securing the borders 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3360–74 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 
(2012)); see also Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, supra note 39, at 330 (outlining the 
discriminatory immigration-targeted provisions of this time period and how the imple-
mentation of such laws, including IRCA, bolstered the “illegal alien” narrative: “With 
more than a million workers of Mexican national origin working [in] the United States, 
the status of ‘illegal’ was inevitable”). 
 61. See § 101(a)(1). 
 62. Statement on Signing, supra note 53.  
 63. See Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, supra note 39, at 330. 
 64. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 
1844, 2050 (2007) (appropriating $200 million to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity to enhance efforts to remove aliens from the United States after they are deemed 
deportable for being convicted of a crime or sentenced to imprisonment). 
 65. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities#a1 (last updated Nov. 13, 2017) (asserting 
that Secure Communities applies to all jurisdictions within the fifty states, the District 
of Columbia and five U.S. territories and that Secured Communities provides “clear 
and common-sense” priorities for immigration enforcement); see also Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal 
Aliens in Jails Nationwide (March 28, 2008) (on file with author) (adding that one of 
the most important features of the plan is the distribution of integration technology that 
will link local law enforcement agencies to DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(“FBI”) biometric databases).  
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against terrorist threats to disproportionately target immigrants of color for ar-
rest, detention, and deportation.66  Indeed, many decried these efforts, asserting 
that the measures unconstitutionally deputize local law enforcement regimes 
with federal immigration authority and serve as a proxy for racial profiling 
practices.67  Advocates filed lawsuits and utilized other forms of advocacy to 
eventually discontinue and revamp Secure Communities and to dismantle 
much of S.B. 1070.68 
But in 2015 to 2016, and particularly in the period leading up to the 2016 
presidential election, the issue of immigration took on an incredibly explicit 
racial and xenophobic tone.  Famously, then-Republican presidential candidate 
(now President) Donald Trump decried Mexican immigrants as “people that 
 
 66. See Vázquez, supra note 27, at 650 (discussing how Secure Communities tar-
geted a disproportionate number of Latino men); Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race 
in the Name of Secure Communities, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 317, 341 (2012) (concluding 
that law enforcement and government authorities intimidate residents through the Se-
cure Communities program by subjecting people typically unnoticed by ICE in removal 
proceedings, which creates a fearful group of second-class citizens).  Indeed, this time 
period is marked by a conflation of national security concerns with immigration, lead-
ing to the success of measures like Secure Communities under the guise of protecting 
communities from criminal threats, including security concerns.  See, e.g., Vázquez, 
supra note 27, at 648–49. 
 67. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became 
Ground Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for 
Latino Civil Rights in America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (asserting that 
S.B. 1070 was the legislature’s attempt to rid the state of people who are or appear to 
be Latino); Ramos, supra note 66, at 329 (proffering that the goal of Secure Commu-
nities is to propagate racial bias through a flawed correlation of people of Mexican 
descent with undocumented immigrants); Daniel Denvir, The ICE Man: Obama’s 
Backdoor Arizona-Style Program, SALON (July 16, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://www.sa-
lon.com/2010/07/16/immigration_safe_communities_obama (pointing out the contra-
diction between the Obama administration’s condemnation of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 with 
its support for the federal Secure Communities program, which in some cases had the 
same effect of racializing and criminalizing immigrants as did the Arizona bill). 
 68. DHS terminated the Secure Communities program in November 2014 and re-
placed it with the Priority Enforcement Program (“PEP”).  See U.S. IMMIGRATION & 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (PEP) (2015), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fact%20sheet/2015/pep_bro-
chure.pdf.  As PEP was unveiled, however, some noted that the differences between it 
and Secure Communities were small.  See, e.g., Jon Greenberg, Fox News Host: Obama 
Ended Program for Tracking Undocumented Immigrants, PUNDITFACT (July 8, 2015, 
10:05 AM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/jul/08/harris-faulk-
ner/fox-news-host-obama-ended-program-tracking-undocum (noting that the main dif-
ference between PEP and Secure Communities is that PEP is more about conviction 
than arrest); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (enjoining as 
federally preempted all provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 except the provision that 
allowed for officers to check the immigration status of arrestees).  An Executive Order 
by Trump proposes to renew the 287(g) Secure Communities program.  See Exec. Or-
der No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
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have lots of problems . . . . They’re bringing drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  
They’re rapists.”69  Perhaps the culturally-specific targeting of certain immi-
grants was at its zenith when Trump declared that “Donald J. Trump is calling 
for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until 
our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.”70  Although 
some challenged his statements,71 his popularity and racist, xenophobic rheto-
ric catapulted him to the White House.  His candidacy and success highlight 
that the practical effect of societal perceptions and stereotypes continue to sup-
port this ongoing racial, cultural, religious and ethnocentric oppression in so-
ciety, law and policy. 
Importantly, this connection between societal perception and eventual 
legislative outcomes is robust and operates against immigrants of color.  Emily 
Ryo’s empirical research shows that American law influences the public per-
ception and resulting narrative in negative, but not positive, ways.72  In other 
words, those exposed to law that was perceived as anti-immigrant or that ste-
reotyped immigrants negatively were more apt to have negative connotations 
of immigrants, specifically Latino/as.  Ryo discusses how participants in her 
study who were exposed to negative rhetoric were more likely to view Latino/a 
immigrants as unintelligent and law-breaking.73  Ryo did not find that this law-
perception connection was present when study participants were exposed to 
 
 69. Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 
16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-
text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/.  As discussed in Part IV, infra, the 
data regarding immigrant criminality proves that immigrants do not commit crimes at 
higher rates than U.S. citizens. 
 70.  Press Release, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., Donald J. Trump 
Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20151207230751/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/don-
ald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration. 
 71. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, Donald Trump’s Anything-Goes Campaign Sets an 
Alarming Political Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/donald-trump-presidential-race.html (providing 
multiple examples of both Democrats and Republicans responding to the way Trump 
ran his campaign and predicting the likely negative outcomes if he were to win the 
presidency); Stephen Collinson, Donald Trump’s Strange Campaign Gets Stranger, 
CNN (Aug. 3, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/politics/donald-
trump-paul-ryan-john-mccain-election-2016/ (providing examples of well-known Re-
publicans who made clear they were voting for Hillary Clinton because of Trump’s 
lack of fitness to be president). 
 72. Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law, 13 STAN. J.  C.R. & 
C.L. 95, 97 (2017).  
 73. Id. at 119–20 (noting one result of her study: “compared to the participants in 
the baseline condition, the participants exposed to the anti-immigration law were sig-
nificantly more likely to report that Latinos were less intelligent . . . and less law-abid-
ing”). 
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seemingly pro-immigrant laws.74  Thus, pro-immigrant laws did not result in 
societal viewpoints of immigrants as intelligent or law-abiding.75 
This conclusion is manifested in the current examples of mothers and 
children immigrants fleeing violence in Central America and arriving in the 
United States, only to be detained in detention centers.76  The ongoing and 
strong perception of these mothers and children as law-breakers who deserve 
to be detained in jail-like conditions highlights the extreme antipathy towards 
immigrants in the United States.77  Consequently, it seems that moving a suc-
cessful immigrant equality movement forward requires a shift in strategy that 
aims to recast the immigrant in a traditional white American normative frame-
work and focuses less on ethnic and cultural difference or diversity.  As Part 
III discusses, same-sex marriage equality advocates employed this strategy to 
successfully argue and ultimately achieve marriage equality for gay people.  
This reframing of narrative from outsider identity to “everyday American” was 
purposeful so as to convince the larger society to embrace marriage equality.  
But, as discussed in Parts IV and V, this strategy only works when the “non-
conforming” community is ostracized – a problematic collateral consequence 
when applied especially to immigrant equality efforts. 
III.  THE CASE STUDY OF THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT 
To set the stage for the discussion in Parts IV and V on the strategic com-
plexities involved in constructing a newly-honed immigrant equality move-
ment, I aim in this Part to provide a corollary (albeit brief) history of the con-
temporary example of the same-sex marriage equality movement, which suc-
cessfully capitalized on the viability of the social and political environment.  
To be sure, the scholarship on the gay rights and marriage equality movement 
is robust, documenting the arduous journey towards civil rights equality that 
culminated in the historic 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, which upheld the rights of same-sex couples to marry.78  In Oberge-
fell, a majority of the Court provided definitive approval of the civil right of 
 
 74. Id. at 122–23. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Emily Gogolak, Meet the Central American Women the United States 
is Detaining and Deporting, NATION (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/arti-
cle/meet-the-central-american-women-the-united-states-is-detaining-and-deporting/ 
(describing the conditions of the family detention centers, housing mothers and chil-
dren: “Inside [Karnes County Residential Center] that day were 604 women . . . virtu-
ally all of whom were asylum seekers from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the 
violence-plagued region of Central America known as the Northern Triangle”).  
 77. See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 992, 997–
98 (describing the ways in which popular rhetoric criminalizes immigrants, including 
the mothers and children seeking asylum: “[These] statements contribute to the popular 
perception that typecasts immigrants as rule-breakers, who are thus rightly subject to 
prison detention”). 
 78. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
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marriage for same-sex couples.  This created an immense impact on the gay 
community, who are now finally afforded a fundamental right that they had 
been unjustifiably and unconstitutionally denied.79  The decision provided a 
clear and profound moment of joy for many, magnified by the overwhelmingly 
positive social and political reaction to the decision.80 
But the road towards marriage equality and gay rights, which began in 
earnest in the late 1960s, was anything but smooth.  Many scholars and advo-
cates have characterized the 1969 Stonewall Riots as a turning point for the 
gay-rights movement and, thus in some respects, for the same-sex marriage 
equality movement.81  This time period was the nadir for the civil rights strug-
gle for racial and ethnic minorities and similarly symbolized a time in which 
gays and lesbians began to vocalize their own calls for equal treatment under 
legal and societal norms.  Section III.A briefly discusses the important litiga-
tion stepping stones from Stonewall to the 2003 landmark decision of Law-
rence v. Texas and the ways in which advocates strategized a narrative shift, 
highlighting gay people as equal to straight people due to commonalities 
among the communities.  Section III.B then comments on how this successful 
narrative shift in the gay rights movement is critiqued precisely because it ad-
heres to a heteronormative rhetoric, thereby degrading the uniqueness of the 
community while also ostracizing those in the gay community who are most 
“outside” this traditional context.  This debate is particularly poignant for im-
migrant-equality advocates searching for an effective and inclusive narrative 
of their own, as explored in Parts IV and V. 
A.  The Road Towards Equality 
The 1969 Stonewall Riots (“Stonewall”) are viewed as a transformative 
event in the gay rights equality movement as they represent an early large-scale 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Letters to the Editor, ‘Love Has Won:’ Reaction to the Supreme 
Court Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/06/27/opinion/love-has-won-reaction-to-the-supreme-court-ruling-
on-gay-marriage.html?_r=0 (expressing positive viewpoints toward Obergefell deci-
sion); Michele Gorman, President Obama: Gay Marriage Ruling ‘Victory for Amer-
ica’, NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/president-
obama-347265?utm_source=internal&utm_campaign=incontent&utm_medium=re-
lated1. 
 81. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. 
L. REV. 1419, 1423–24 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge, A History] (discussing the riots in 
which gays and lesbians fought back against what was a typical police raid at the Stone-
wall Bar gay club and noting how the event highlights a sea-change in the same-sex 
marriage equality movement: “Before 1969, the notion of a same-sex couple entering 
into state-sanctioned marriage seemed culturally and legally implausible in this country 
. . . . The Stonewall riots changed all that, however, as gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals 
came out of the closet in substantial numbers.  Many of these newly-liberated couples 
formed openly committed relationships functionally similar to different-sex mar-
riages”). 
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effort to normalize gay people in what had been a historically discriminatory 
landscape.82  Andrew M. Jacobs notes that, as a consequence of Stonewall, gay 
people began to strategically and purposefully shift the narrative and rhetoric 
away from the “outsider homosexual” to the normalized “gay” person, the 
word that gay people often used in their own community.83  This strategic em-
ployment of “visibility rhetoric” was a necessary first step to “societal cogni-
zance of lesbians and gays as a social group [which would precede] any remedy 
formulated in group terms for injuries suffered by” gays and lesbians.84  “Vis-
ibility rhetoric,” Jacobs asserts, “says, ‘I am.’”85  Importantly, this movement 
also demanded that the community embrace its unique identity while simulta-
neously framing its demands for equality as an exercise in normative idealism.  
In this sense, then, Stonewall and the movement that followed to bring gay 
people more into the heteronormative mainstream signaled the beginning of a 
societal shift away from merely highlighting differences and towards a focus 
on similarities with the straight majority and, in particular, the majority that 
seeks monogamous commitment. 
It was also at this time that advocates began to more fervently assert de-
mands for legal equality.  William Eskridge, Jr. notes that Stonewall and the 
resulting community activism in the legal and political realm sparked new calls 
for what would be the precursor to marriage equality: 
As part of this demand for acknowledgment or acceptance, many activ-
ists sought legal recognition of same-sex marriages on the same terms 
as different-sex marriages, as part of a general movement to end all 
forms of state discrimination against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.86 
Again, this movement required advocates to shift the ways in which the larger 
heteronormative-minded society would characterize the gay community, mov-
ing from an outsider to an acceptable member of society.  Jacobs discusses the 
societal reconstitution of gay identity beginning in the early 1970s, noting: 
 
 82. See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case 
of the Gay Rights Movement, 1969–1991, 72 NEB. L. REV. 723, 725–26 (1993) (assert-
ing that the Stonewall riots marked the beginning of the gay liberation movement be-
cause “it was active, collective, public action by gays as and for gays. Second, Stone-
wall energized lesbians and gays across the country to spontaneously form political 
associations and to publicly demonstrate in affirmation of gayness.  Thus, Stonewall 
was a milestone as a public declaration and as a catalyst for gay political activity and 
consciousness” (footnote omitted)). 
 83. Id. at 726. 
 84. Id. at 725. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Eskridge, A History, supra note 81, at 1424.  Eskridge discusses how “prag-
matic” activists sought these changes through incremental steps that would begin with 
decriminalization of behaviors and eventually lead to marriage equality.  See id. at 
1430–32, 1502–04. 
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[S]ociety viewed “homosexuals” much as it did murderers and child 
molesters: . . . a silent, isolated, deviant set of outlaws, not as a visible, 
aggregative, tolerable set of like persons with a positive agenda for 
themselves.  To create new social knowledge, gays needed to . . . create 
new meanings for their group that would destroy and replace the old 
meanings.87 
Yet, as he notes, at that time more than seventy percent of polled Americans 
viewed homosexuality negatively,88 a stark contrast to 2016 polling, in which 
sixty-three percent of Americans had a positive view of gay people.89  The cur-
rent polling demonstrates, then, that this rhetorical shifting was a highly suc-
cessful strategy that embraced incremental steps, eventually leading to mar-
riage equality. 
But the shift from explicit discrimination – the prohibition, for example, 
against same-sex sexual activity – to inclusion and the arrival of marriage 
equality was the product of a long-term, evolving strategy.  Jacobs discusses 
how advocates for gay equality, while using visibility tactics, had to fight 
against a “scourge rhetoric” in which anti-gay advocates demonized gay people 
according to the same stereotypes of sexual deviants and child predators.90  To 
battle against such a formidable narrative, gay equality advocates moved away 
from visibility tactics, concentrating instead on publicly humanizing gay peo-
ple by putting forth exemplars of the gay community and emphasizing the harm 
afflicted against such people from the larger society.91  Thus, in what Jacobs 
 
 87. Jacobs, supra note 82, at 729. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Hannah Fingerhut, Support Steady for Same-Sex Marriage and Ac-
ceptance of Homosexuality, PEW RES. CTR (May 12, 2016), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2016/05/12/support-steady-for-same-sex-marriage-and-ac-
ceptance-of-homosexuality/ (reporting polling data from 2016).  Moreover, the study 
shows that, of Americans who report themselves as unaffiliated with a particular reli-
gion, eighty percent have a positive view of gay people.  See id. 
 90. See Jacobs, supra note 82, at 729–34.  Jacobs describes the scourge rhetoric 
example of the repeal of a 1977 Dade County, Florida anti-discriminatory provision 
aimed at protecting gay people from housing and employment discrimination.  Id.  Vot-
ers repealed the measure after a concerted campaign that focused on painting gay peo-
ple as sexual deviants who would molest children if allowed to be teachers.  See id. at 
732.  Jacobs notes that pro-gay advocates who tried to combat the repeal campaign 
failed because they focused on “espousing the ‘good’ claim [i.e., that gay is good] in-
stead of steering the discourse toward the question of discrimination or other narrow 
political question at issue in the referendum.”  Id.  That strategy could not defeat the 
powerful “gay as scourge” rhetoric.  See id. 
 91. Authors in the popular media, for example, described the pursuit of marriage 
equality as akin to seeking fulfilment of gay equality rights.  See, e.g., Molly Ball, How 
Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-
politics-activism/397052/.  Ball quotes advocate (and one of the chief strategists in the 
marriage equality movement) Evan Wolfson: 
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calls the “victimage rhetoric,” gay people were painted as the target of unfair, 
unjust and immoral violence and discrimination.92  As he notes, this strategy 
“h[e]ld inherently greater promise for pro-gay rhetors.  Gay rights advocates 
have had trouble establishing the concept of gay as good in the public con-
sciousness; however, establishing the notion that gays are victims in the public 
psyche [was] an attainable goal.”93  In this way, then, the political and societal 
shift away from emphasizing perceived differences of gay people (which, up 
to that time had equated to morally corrupt) to, instead, viewing them as a sym-
pathetic victim figure helped to humanize the community in the eyes of the 
American public. 
Gay rights advocates also utilized this humanizing approach to fight for 
legal equality, asserting that same-sex marriage prohibitions amounted to il-
logical discrimination, akin to the anti-miscegenation laws deemed unconstitu-
tional in Loving v. Virginia.94  Just like in Loving and subsequent precedent, 
advocates argued that same-sex marriage bans were also violations of the Due 
Process Clause because they unconstitutionally infringed upon the fundamen-
tal right to marry.95  They thus argued that gay people wishing to marry were 
no different than any other person wishing to marry and, thus, the Constitution 
necessarily extends to their claims.  Moreover, under an Equal Protection anal-
ysis, lawyers for marriage equality historically argued that same-sex marriage 
bans discriminated against gay people because of their gender (e.g., a woman 
could not marry another woman only because they are both women).96 
Indeed, the approach of framing gay rights as the unconstitutional depri-
vation of rights based on an immutable characteristic of the person – and away 
from the moral justness of equality for gay people or for homosexual conduct 
 
 
What is the center, the heart, of the discrimination gay people face?  It’s the 
denial of our love.  And what is the central institution of love?  It’s marriage.  
Therefore, we needed to claim the freedom to marry, because it would be an 
engine of transformation for the way society viewed gay people. 
 
Id. Ball also discusses the shift in strategy employed by marriage equality advocates: 
“[T]he new ads featured straight people talking about their gay relatives: the mother or 
sister or grandfather of a gay person, talking about their loved one’s commitment to a 
partner.”  Id.  As discussed infra in Part V, this strategy of normalization and humani-
zation played (and continues to play) a significant role in the civil rights movement for 
racial equality. 
 92. Jacobs, supra note 82, at 733–37. 
 93. Id. at 736. 
 94. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 95. See Eskridge, A History, supra note 81, at 1424–25 & n.9 (discussing Loving; 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); and 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in the context of the same-sex marriage 
equality Due Process Clause precedent). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 1425. 
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itself – solidified after the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision that upheld Georgia’s law criminalizing sodomy.97  In Bowers, a major-
ity of the Court interpreted the claim seeking to strike down the anti-sodomy 
law as one asserting a positive right to the actual homosexual sodomy act.  Us-
ing that lens, the Court thus held that there is no “fundamental right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy.”98  Moreover, Justice Burger’s concurrence empha-
sized the apparent critical moralistic issues, citing millennia of historical tradi-
tion purportedly upholding criminalization of sodomy, stating: 
The common law of England, including its prohibition of sodomy, be-
came the received law of Georgia and the other Colonies.  In 1816 the 
Georgia Legislature passed the statute at issue here, and that statute has 
been continuously in force in one form or another since that time.  To 
hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fun-
damental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.99 
In short, the majority and concurrence in Bowers epitomized the anti-gay nar-
rative of demonizing gay people based on supposed moral and traditional no-
tions of actual (perceived) gay conduct. 
In contrast, the Bowers dissenters framed the issue as one of rights against 
governmental intervention in private matters, which as Justice Blackmun as-
serted, amounts to “the right to be let alone.”100  Moreover, Justice Blackmun 
and the other dissenters emphasized the rights of gay people as a community 
to live as they choose as long as there is no harm to the public101 and that ap-
 
 97. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Jacobs, supra note 82, at 737–42 (discussing the 
rhetorical formulations used in the various opinions in Bowers). 
 98. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
 99. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 101. See id. at 204–06 (citing precedent upholding fealty to diversity of opinion and 
lifestyle when not in contradiction to important public safety or governmental func-
tions, including Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223–24 (1972) (“There can be no 
assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are 
‘wrong.’  A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or inter-
ests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”)); id. at 218–19 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens, in dissent and joined by others, emphasized that the 
State has offered no legitimate interest in prohibiting the conduct if applied solely to 
homosexual behavior: “Although the meaning of the principle that ‘all men are created 
equal’ is not always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the same 
interest in ‘liberty’ that the members of the majority share.  From the standpoint of the 
individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how 
he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his per-
sonal and voluntary associations with his companions.  State intrusion into the private 
conduct of either is equally burdensome.”). 
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parent historical tradition cannot be the basis to protect inherently discrimina-
tory legislation.102  As Justice Blackmun concluded: “[T]he mere knowledge 
that other individuals do not adhere to one’s value system cannot be a legally 
cognizable interest let alone an interest that can justify invading the houses, 
hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently.”103  
Thus, as opposed to the majority and concurrences, the dissenters framed the 
narrative regarding gay people not pursuant to particular conduct or the pursuit 
of new positive rights but rather as merely the assertion of rights that apply to 
all, regardless of sexual orientation identity.  As Jacobs documents in his dis-
cussion of a 1991 California ballot initiative aimed at prohibiting sexual orien-
tation discrimination in employment and housing, the strategic shift after Bow-
ers 
moved from the moral to the political, and . . . used empirical claims of 
harm to narrowly focus the rights-claim.  This enabled the polity to al-
leviate victimization and prevent discrimination with narrowly-tailored 
remedies which did not endorse homosexuality.  The shifted discourse 
was political, not moral, and it used victimage images to convey the 
need for negative rights, or freedoms from particular harms.104 
As Jacobs (writing in 1993) concludes, then, gay-rights advocates would be 
wise to embrace this narrative of victimage, rather than try to convince the 
general public that gays are moral or “just as normal” as their heterosexual 
neighbors.105 
Indeed, the narrative that gay people are worthy of protection from certain 
harms – just like everyone else – underscored the U.S. Supreme Court’s next 
big pronouncement in the gay rights movement in the 1996 case, Romer v. Ev-
ans. 106  In Romer, the Court, although not explicitly overruling Bowers, de-
clared unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds a Colorado ballot initia-
tive, known as “Amendment 2,” that would have amended the Colorado Con-
stitution to prohibit the enactment of legislation protecting gay people from 
certain kinds of discrimination.107  In the decision, the Court espoused a pro-
gay view that upholds protectionism of gay people and decries discrimination 
 
 102. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Justice Blackmun cites, among other 
precedent, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for the proposition that “I cannot agree 
that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with 
which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny.”). 
 103. Id. at 213 (citation omitted). 
 104. Jacobs, supra note 82, at 747.  Jacobs documents the path of the California 
bill, which was ultimately vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson, who asserted pro-business, 
anti-litigation reasons for the veto while acknowledging the prevalence of gay-bashing 
and discriminatory practices.  See id. at 748–52. 
 105. See id. at 755–56. 
 106. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996). 
 107. Id. (discussing the Colorado ballot initiative to amend the Colorado Constitu-
tion, known as “Amendment 2”). 
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against gays based solely on their orientation.108  Importantly, and as Jacobs, 
expounding on his earlier piece, notes, the Court does not “valoriz[e] or 
vilif[y]” gays, but rather adopts a victimage rhetoric, comparing Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 to the country’s racist past.109  Eskridge notes the important rhe-
torical shift employed by the Court in Romer, which referred to the “respond-
ents respectfully as gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals” and described the “pro-
tections served by antidiscrimination laws as ‘normal’ protections everyone 
else either takes for granted or enjoys – and not as the ‘special rights’ claimed 
by the state and the dissenting opinion.”110  Further commenting on the vic-
timage strategic success of Romer, Eskridge notes, “Justice Kennedy also 
openly recognized that much of the support of the amendment was inspired by 
antigay ‘animus’ . . . .”111  This strategic advocacy shift away from highlighting 
the uniqueness of gays (e.g., the early post-Stonewall movement) towards fo-
cusing on the similarities between gay people and straight people and the in-
dignity put on gay people by discriminatory measures (i.e., a victimage rheto-
ric) led to victory in Romer112 and set the stage for future litigation success. 
Advocates scored a next important victory in the 2003 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision of Lawrence v. Texas,113 in which the Court overruled Bowers 
and deemed state anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional.114  As Eskridge surmises, 
“Read together, Romer and Lawrence represent a regime shift for gay people 
analogous to the regime shift that Brown and Loving represented for people of 
color and that Roe and Craig represented for women.”115  Indeed, as Nancy 
Levit discusses, the Court’s decisions from Bowers to Lawrence represent a 
 
 108. Id. at 633. 
 109. See Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn’t Built in a Day: The Subtle Transfor-
mation in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 893, 952–53 (1996) 
[hereinafter Jacobs, Romer Wasn’t Built in a Day]. 
 110. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial 
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1038 (2004) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Lawrence’s Jurisprudence]. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider 
to Insider and Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT 
Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 525–26 (2015) (describing this shift from calls of 
“We’re here!  We’re queer!  Get used to it!” to “We’re just like you,” concluding that 
“rather than seek to disrupt the paradigm of heteronormativity, assimilation-oriented 
homosexuals sought to fit gay rights into the existing legal and social structure, without 
threatening to upend the social order”). 
 113. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 114. See id.; see also Eskridge, Lawrence’s Jurisprudence, supra note 110, at 1040 
(commenting on the majority opinion in Lawrence, which explicitly and forcefully re-
pudiated the Court’s decision in Bowers: “The Court concluded that ‘Hardwick was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.’  Never in its history has the 
Supreme Court so pointedly repudiated a precedent.  With this rebuke, an era in con-
stitutional history ended” (footnote omitted) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)). 
 115. Eskridge, Lawrence’s Jurisprudence, supra note 110, at 1040 (footnotes omit-
ted).  
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“tectonic shift” in the perception and narrative espoused regarding gay peo-
ple.116  Once decried as morally bankrupt and unworthy of basic civil rights 
protections because of their participation or perceived participation in “partic-
ular sexual acts,” in Lawrence, gay people and their relationships were finally 
treated with importance and dignity.117 
In this sense, then, pro-gay rights advocates achieved an incredible vic-
tory in recharacterizing the struggle for equality from one of highlighting 
uniqueness (or difference) to emphasizing commonalities with straight com-
munities by, first, highlighting victimization tactics so as to draw on empathic 
and sympathetic norms.118  Far from “we’re here; we’re queer” or “gay is 
good,” the narrative morphed into a call for equal protections for people and 
relationships that were effectively no different from the straight “ideal.”  Sim-
ilarly, advocates’ strategic restructuring of the pro-gay rights narrative in the 
fight for same-sex marriage equality utilized this call for freedom from dis-
crimination while also touting a claim for sameness in a heteronormative con-
text.  As the next Section explores, this rhetorical framework, while ultimately 
successful, has its critiques.  This discussion is particularly relevant in fore-
shadowing an effective strategy for immigrant rights, as Part IV asserts. 
B.  Identity Politics Strategy and Backlash – the Othering Effects of 
Embracing Sameness 
Most proponents of gay rights would likely agree that the Obergefell de-
cision represents a monumental step forward.  The declaration that people fi-
nally have the constitutional right to marry whom they choose solidified a key 
victory in the long, arduous journey for equal treatment of gay people.  But in 
exploring the rhetoric employed by the Obergefell majority, I and other critics 
uncover troubling effects of the dominant narrative used post-Bowers and ulti-
mately to great success in Lawrence.  As one example, as Levit writing in a 
pre-Obergefell piece summarizes, advocates relying upon the dominant narra-
tive to achieve gay-rights equality risk the subordination of those outside the 
 
 116. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 29–30 (2010) [hereinafter Levit, Theorizing and Litigat-
ing]. 
 117. Id. at 30. 
 118. To be sure, the equality battle has not been won.  Other recent victories of the 
gay rights movement, specifically in the employment discrimination context, have not 
been widespread.  In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 
345 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh Circuit became one of the few federal courts to hold 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating 
on the basis of sexual orientation. 
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dominate narrative119 and instead should utilize a narrative of equality theory 
based on “respect for the common humanity of all people.”120 
This Section begins with an exploration of the Obergefell narrative and 
then discusses the fealty to the heteronormative ideal of marriage, illustrating 
how the narrative subordinates those living outside the norm.  This discussion 
is especially illustrative in crafting the civil rights narrative of immigrant equal-
ity, as explored more below. 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy ends the majority opinion with the follow-
ing statement: 
     From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human 
history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage.  The lifelong 
union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity 
to all persons, without regard to their station in life.  Marriage is sacred 
to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those 
who find meaning in the secular realm.  Its dynamic allows two people 
to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes 
greater than just the two persons.  Rising from the most basic human 
needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspira-
tions.121 
The language seems apt for a marriage sermon and uncharacteristically effu-
sive for constitutional precedent.122  Placing collective hopes and aspirations in 
the governmental institution of marriage (which is what, after all, same-sex 
couples were seeking – the right to have the State and state recognize their 
union under the domestic marriage laws) affords a great deal of faith and def-
erence to the institution.  The majority further notes: “Marriage responds to the 
universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there.  It 
offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while 
both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”123  Here, too, mar-
riage is ascribed incredible power – not only does it hold Americans’ collective 
 
 119. Levit, Theorizing and Litigating, supra note 116, at 30. 
 120. Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and An-
tisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 870 (2000) [here-
inafter Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness]. 
 121. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94 (2015). 
 122. Other writers remarked on the majority’s choice of language and rhetoric.  See, 
e.g., Paul Horwitz, Pomp and Circumstances, COMMONWEAL (July 10, 2015), 
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/pomp-circumstances (“Kennedy should have 
devoted more effort to clarity and guidance, and less to pomp and sentimentality.”); 
Garrett Epps, The U.S. Supreme Court Fulfills Its Promises on Same-Sex Marriage,  
ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2015/06/same-sex-marriage-supreme-court-obergefell/396995/ (quoting 
Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell, which characterized Kennedy’s opinion as “filled with 
‘mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages’ written ‘in a style as pretentious 
as its content is egotistic’”). 
 123. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
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hopes and aspirations but also provides the answer to an apparent universal fear 
of loneliness. 
Indeed, the language of Obergefell adopts a dominant heteronormative-
focused narrative seeking society’s longstanding approval of marriage relation-
ships to achieve the goal of same-sex equality.124  But advocates should ask 
what effect embracing the norm may have for others – like that of the gay per-
son seeking recognition of his or her equal status in society while not wishing 
to marry.  Does Obergefell uplift gay rights, generally?125  Beyond gay-rights 
consciousness, the language of Obergell may have a similar othering effect on, 
for example, heterosexual couples who do not seek the state-sponsored impri-
matur of their relationship through marriage but seek respect for their relation-
ships and families.  Yet, the Obergefell rhetoric suggests that people of any 
sexual orientation who remain unmarried are resigned to an unfulfilled life de-
void of companionship and understanding. 
To be sure, the Obergefell opinion builds upon and solidifies the reifica-
tion of the American marriage to the ongoing detriment of a non-traditional 
family structure and of an individual’s choice to eschew the government-spon-
sored marriage institution.  Although this fealty to marriage is not surprising in 
the context of civil rights advancement of marriage equality, the marriage nar-
rative concomitantly demeans those who do not fit within its traditional pur-
view.  This advocacy strategy to build support for equality movements by using 
a heteronormative context – normalizing gay marriage by drawing compari-
sons to traditional heterosexual family structures – ultimately results in the den-
igration of those residing outside these contextual boundaries.126 
To be sure, the preference for the marriage institution is well established 
in our family law canon, as noted by both the majority and dissenters in Ober-
gefell.127  The litigants and lawyers in Obergefell strategically relied upon this 
 
 124. See, e.g., Stewart Chang, Is Gay the New Asian?: Marriage Equality and the 
Dawn of a New Model Minority, 23 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 23 (2016) (writing about the 
marriage equality narrative in the context of similar narrative devices for Asian Amer-
icans and cautioning against an ascription to a normative ideal: “[T]he goal of marriage 
equality venerates marriage as an ideal to be emulated and achieved by gay couples, 
which in turn promotes further homogeneity with normative family structures in Amer-
ica” (footnote omitted)). 
 125. See, e.g., Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 869 (asking 
in another context: “If respect for gay and lesbian relationships comes only from their 
resemblance to categories of straight relationships, how can laws transform conscious-
ness?”). 
 126. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 124, at 27 (noting these effects of the Obergefell 
rhetoric, “When formal equality is tied to marriage, only those who subscribe to and 
have access to the institution of marriage are able to attain equality.  In this respect, 
Obergefell stifles heterogeneous sexualities.  Through Obergefell, what is gained is not 
so much a right to marry, but access to the rights that come with marriage” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 127. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601; id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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historical fealty to marriage to craft their winning arguments.128  The 1888 case 
of Maynard v. Hill set the stage for the legal preference for marriage.  In that 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether an order of the Oregon terri-
tory legislative body legally dissolved the marriage of David and Lydia 
Maynard, even though Lydia knew nothing about the action.129  Ultimately af-
firming the decision of the lower court upholding the legislative divorce, the 
Court cited another court’s description of the contractual and societal character 
of marriage as: 
a social relation like that of parent and child, the obligations of which 
arise not from the consent of concurring minds, but are the creation of 
the law itself, a relation the most important, as affecting the happiness 
of individuals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the 
purest tie of social life, and the true basis of human progress.130 
In 1967, in declaring Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional, 
thereby ending the State’s power to prohibit interracial marriage, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Loving v. Virginia declared that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic 
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”131  The 
Court’s pronouncement of the importance of marriage continued in Zablocki v. 
Redhail, when the fundamental right of marriage was explicitly solidified132 
and in Turner v. Safley, when the right to marry was extended to prisoners not 
serving a life sentence.133 
In fact, the Obergefell majority cites to each of these precedents to reaf-
firm that extending the right to marry a person of the same sex is within the 
fundamental constitutionally-protected right to marry.134  By placing same-sex 
marriage within the context of past challenges to marry, Obergefell asserts that 
people wishing to marry someone of the same sex want nothing more than what 
 
 128. This strategy is clearly outlined in the briefs filed in the Obergefell litigation.  
See Brief for Petitioners at 37, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556) (discussing 
the benefits that marriage has historically conferred on couples, such as privacy rights, 
property rights and control over important family decisions, to justify the fight for mar-
riage equality). 
 129. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 192–93 (1888). 
 130. Id. at 211–12 (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 483 (1863)). 
 131. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 132. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) (reviewing precedent and 
reaffirming the fundamental nature of marriage as akin to the right to privacy protec-
tions). 
 133. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987). 
 134. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602, 2604 (2015) (asserting that “[t]he 
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection 
of the laws” and that “same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-
sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right”). 
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everyone else is entitled to: “Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the peti-
tioners seek it for themselves because of their respect – and need – for its priv-
ileges and responsibilities.  And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex 
marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.”135  Thus, from 
Maynard to Obergefell, the lesson is that marriage is a fundamental legal and 
social institution within which individuals achieve the respectful state of for-
malized commitment.  This description of the normalcy of what gay people 
seek hearkens back to the victory in Romer and Lawrence and shows the sharp 
contrast that had been achieved since the archaic language of Bowers.  By this 
point, then, the victimage rhetoric had proven useful in successfully painting 
the deprivation of equal rights to gay people as akin to the deprivation of the 
same rights for the straight norm. 
As another crucial strategic point, advocates carefully chose the plaintiffs 
in Obergefell to paint an empathetic portrait of this aggrieved community.  
James Obergefell and John Arthur lived as committed partners for decades be-
fore traveling from their home state of Ohio to Maryland to marry.136  Mr. Ar-
thur, suffering from the debilitating effects of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(“ALS”) disease had to be transported in a private medical transport plane, and 
the two men married on the tarmac upon landing at Baltimore.137  A few months 
later when Mr. Arthur succumbed to the disease, Mr. Obergefell was not al-
lowed to be listed as his spouse on the death certificate and thus sued to have 
Ohio recognize his Maryland marriage.138  The Obergefell opinion also profiles 
Army Reserve First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his husband Thomas Kostura who 
married in New York but live in Tennessee where Mr. DeKoe works for the 
Army Reserve.139  A veteran of the war in Afghanistan, Mr. DeKoe “served 
this Nation to preserve the freedom the Constitution protects” while his mar-
riage was outlawed in his home state of Tennessee.140  Mr. DeKoe and Mr. 
Kostura thus sued for recognition of their marriage.  With each story, the face 
of same-sex marriage shines a harsh light back at the critic of the practice – 
who among us, after all, wants to deny the dignity of formalized recognition of 
this union to the widower or the Army veteran?  The incredibly compelling 
histories of the profiled plaintiffs shore up the narrative that the Court uses in 
discussing just how important marriage is to all couples (including those cou-
ples who happen to be of the same sex) seeking to marry. 
Moreover, Obergefell – just as U.S. Supreme Court precedent before it – 
touts marriage as essential to the unassailable and foundational right of procre-
ation and for raising children.141  Plaintiffs April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, 
 
 135. Id. at 2594. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2594–95. 
 139. Id. at 2595. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2600; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (citing 
approvingly past precedent in which “the Court recognized that the right ‘to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the 
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who sought to marry in their home state of Michigan, adopted three children, 
but because Michigan would not let both of them serve as each child’s adoptive 
parents, each of their children could only have one of the women as his/her 
adoptive mother.142  Therefore, the Court noted that “[i]f an emergency were 
to arise, schools and hospitals may treat the three children as if they had only 
one parent.  And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other 
would have no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to 
adopt.”143  Thus, for critically important reasons, the parents sought that Mich-
igan recognize their union as a marriage, thereby allowing both parents to adopt 
each child.144 
Like many other same-sex American parents seeking the validity of mar-
riage in their states, Plaintiffs DeBoer and Rowse represent the injustice of not 
being able to formalize their union for not only their sake but for their children.  
But beyond the very real problems of what would happen to their children in 
an emergency or should one of the mothers die, the Court in Obergefell again 
relied on the dignity that marriage ostensibly brings to families with children.  
In dramatic fashion, the Court proclaimed: 
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, 
their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser.  They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by 
unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more 
difficult and uncertain family life.  The marriage laws at issue here thus 
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.145 
Citing the 2013 precedent of U.S. v. Windsor, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the section of the Defense of Marriage Act that defined marriage 
as only between one man and one woman for federal law purposes,146 the Court 
opined that raising children is ideally accomplished by married parents.147 
Without the benefits of such a formally-recognized family, children of di-
 
Due Process Clause [and] . . . marriage was described as ‘fundamental to the very ex-
istence and survival of the race’” (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923), and then quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942))). 
 142. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 143. Id. 
 144. DeBoer and Rowse, who have since the lawsuit adopted another child, recently 
married in Michigan and are moving to each become adoptive parents of the children 
and change their names to DeBoer-Rowse.  See Oralandar Brand-Williams, DeBoer 
and Rowse Exchange Vows in ‘Historic’ Wedding, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 23, 2015, 4:20 
AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/oakland-
county/2015/08/22/deboer-rowse-exchange-vows-historic-wedding/32212729/. 
 145. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)). 
 146. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 147. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590. 
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vorced parents, of single parents, or of no biological parents (for example, chil-
dren raised by other family members) are apparently destined to live lives de-
void of dignity and full of harm and humiliation.148  In this sense, too, Oberge-
fell places the institution of marriage on a pedestal to be sought after and hope-
fully achieved not only for the individual adult but also for the good parent.  
Deprivation of this right would thus result in unjust and severe harm to both 
the adults seeking to marry and their children. 
Indeed, the same-sex marriage equality movement achieved successes 
and setbacks throughout the journey towards ultimately achieving constitu-
tional equality under Obergefell.  As “Freedom to Marry,” a leading marriage 
equality non-profit organization, details in its history of the movement, advo-
cates had a two-pronged approach.  On the legal front, the strategy was to 
change the laws at the state level and achieve enough success in enough states 
to move the national momentum towards legalizing same-sex marriage every-
where.149  To achieve this legal reform, however, advocates needed a second 
strategic focus that concentrated on changing societal views about gay people 
and gay marriage.  Thus, as described in the discussion of the Massachusetts 
efforts to legalize same-sex marriage, as the lawyers argued the case in the 
courts, the “Massachusetts Freedom to Marry Coalition engaged with LGBT 
community and potential non-gay allies in the legislature, in houses of worship 
and elsewhere, explaining why marriage matters to all loving couples.”150 
It is unsurprising that the advocates in Obergefell focused on the prefer-
ence for marriage to make the case for same-sex marriage equality.  By con-
textualizing gay marriage as just like straight marriage, in which gay couples 
seek nothing more than what straight couples are entitled to, and by presenting 
the face of same-sex marriage as empathetic and deserving, Obergefell speaks 
to the opponents of same-sex marriage or at least to those on the fence about 
it.  In this sense, the advocates’ narrative strategy formed post-Stonewall and 
Bowers comes full circle.  By placing gay marriage in a heteronormative con-
text, it becomes less about sexual preferences and orientation but instead about 
same-sex couples “aspir[ing] to the transcendent purposes of marriage and 
seek[ing] fulfillment in its highest meaning.”151  Thus, the gay couple seeking 
to marry fits well into the socially-prescribed box of normalcy and familiarity. 
 
 148. See Levit, Theorizing and Litigating, supra note 116, at 53–54 (discussing 
amicus efforts in the same-sex marriage equality case litigated in California to argue 
that “children are harmed financially, emotionally, and psychologically if their parents 
are not allowed to marry – that ‘they recognize they and their parents are treated as 
second-class citizens.’ . . . These themes resonated with the California Supreme Court, 
which recognized that state sanctioning of same-sex marriage provides children with a 
secure legal basis for their parents’ union”). 
 149. See Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a Trans-
formative Campaign, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.free-
domtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/7
2017] NARRATIVE REFORM DILEMMAS 1121 
In her 2000 article (pre-Obergefell), Levit defines this strategy as one 
based on “equality theory,” in which advocates may remain agnostic about the 
actual idealization of the hetero norm but recognize that ascribing gays to the 
norm is the most practical way to achieve equality.  She asserts: 
Equality theorists accept . . . the given identity categories of homosex-
uals and heterosexuals, but try to show that sexual differences should 
not make a difference, socially or legally. . . . Equality-seeking political 
activists must be prepared to argue that to the extent an ideal model of 
family life exists, gays and lesbians conform to that snapshot.152 
This theory contrasts with what she deems the “outsider theory” in which pro-
ponents criticize the equality theoretical model as erasing a critical component 
of sexual minorities’ unique identity by aligning too closely with the hetero 
norm.153  In an outsider theoretical model, proponents argue for equality for 
gays while emphasizing and even celebrating their differences from 
straights.154  Moreover, this outsider theory recognizes that by ascribing too 
closely to a heteronormative ideal, those gays and sexual minorities who look 
and/or are less like the ideal will still be left out of the equality movement. 
Ascribing to this ideal may even create backlash within the gay community 
itself.  Levit notes: “Poor, nonwhite committed monogamous gay couples will 
not be treated like upper middle class white committed monogamous gay cou-
ples.  Since mainstreaming will work selectively . . .  to the extent that an equal-
ity strategy relies on a heterosexual ideal, it risks polarizing and destroying a 
 
 152. Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 880. 
 153. Id. at 886–87 (discussing other scholars’ works and noting that for outsider 
theorists, “One primary concern [regarding the equality theory] centers on the idea that 
if sexual others try to show the same entitlement to rights as straights, they will be 
forced to hide their unique or distinctive traits”). 
 154. Id.; see also Mary Bernstein, Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses 
of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement, 3 AM. J. SOC. 531, 532 (1997) (discuss-
ing the gay rights movement’s strategic shift in advocating for equality: “Over time, 
‘identity’ movements shift their emphasis between celebrating and suppressing differ-
ences from the majority . . . . the lesbian and gay movement has been altered from a 
movement for cultural transformation through sexual liberation to one that seeks 
achievement of political rights through a narrow, ethnic-like . . . interest-group politics” 
(citation omitted)). 
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sense of community among sexual minorities.”155  Thus, ascription to a heter-
onormative ideal risks damage to the sense of community itself.156 
Further, a focus on highlighting the idealized norm not only serves to 
sever inter-community ties, it subjugates those who do not fit the archetype.  
As Alexander Nourafshan and Angela Onwuachi-Willig argue, the “dominant 
image” propagated in the same-sex marriage equality movement as a “white, 
upper middle class, educated, and Northern-city-based gay community . . .  
worked to persuade those in the decision-making elite that the gay commu-
nity’s interests converge with their own because it implicitly reinforces racial, 
class, and regional hierarchies within the gay community and in society more 
generally.”157  In this sense, then, the successes of an equality theoretical model 
were built in part on the already established discriminatory models that perme-
ate general society.  By aligning with the most traditional “American” ideal – 
the middle to upper-class, formally educated, white heterosexual couple – ad-
vocates for marriage equality sought to paint gays as being “just like everyone 
else,” a strategy that necessarily subordinates those historically outside the tra-
ditional ideal. 
 
 155. Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 887; accord Nouraf-
shan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 536 (commenting on the subordinating 
discriminatory effect of the dominant upper-class white narrative used in the gay-rights 
movement: “This strategy for establishing legal protection and social equality for gays 
and lesbians, through the use of whiteness, marginalize[d] gays and lesbians of color 
and normalize[d] white gay identity without accounting for the substantial portion of 
the gay community that is non-white”). 
 156. See Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 887; Nourafshan 
& Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 536; Chang, supra note 124, at 27–28.  As the 
Freedom to Marry organization notes in its article describing the history of the marriage 
equality movement: 
 
Some activists presented ideological resistance to marriage entirely, asserting 
that working to win marriage was in itself a flawed goal – arguing that marriage 
is a patriarchal institution that should be avoided and that LGBT people should 
chart their own path for sexual liberation and relationships rather than embrace 
marriage.  Others had strategic concerns, declaring that the nation would never 
be ready to allow same-sex couples to wed and that the pursuit would harm the 
community’s ability to prevail on other, seemingly more likely, gains. 
 
Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide, supra note 149.  
 157. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 522; accord Chang, supra 
note 124, at 30 (noting the racialized effects of the marriage equality movement’s fealty 
to the normative structure: “The incrementalist strategy towards gay rights dissociated 
from this type of reckless behavior and developed an image of the good gay that repre-
sented a desire for inclusion in normative family life.  However, with this shift the face 
of gay rights also became increasingly whitewashed and underplayed intersectional 
identities.  The marriage equality movement emphasized stability traditionally associ-
ated with normative white families” (footnotes omitted)). 
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This advocacy strategy in the marriage equality movement to normalize 
the narrative was not new.  Mildred Jeter, “a Negro woman,” and Richard Lov-
ing, “a white man,” simply wanted to live as husband and wife in their home 
state of Virginia but instead were convicted under the Virginia anti-miscege-
nation statute and sentenced to a year in jail for the crime of getting married.158  
Such an outcome represents inequality at its clearest.  Edith Windsor married 
Thea Spyer in Canada after decades of living as life partners.159  Upon Spyer’s 
death, Windsor inherited Spyer’s estate and was slapped with a $363,053 tax 
bill because, as a woman married to another woman, she was not considered a 
lawful spouse for federal government purposes and thus did not qualify for the 
spousal estate tax exemption.160  Windsor’s reality represents an injustice per-
petrated by the federal government against a grieving widow.161  In these ex-
amples, the heteronormative narrative framing was an important and extremely 
useful strategy to achieve civil rights successes in the U.S. Supreme Court 
cases of Loving v. Virginia and United States v. Windsor. 
But the framing necessarily excludes those who are not part of a two-
parent family or a married couple.  Indeed, in his dissent in Obergefell, Justice 
Thomas noted: 
The majority also suggests that marriage confers “nobility” on indi-
viduals.  I am unsure what that means.  People may choose to marry or 
not to marry.  The decision to do so does not make one person more 
“noble” than another.  And the suggestion that Americans who choose 
not to marry are inferior to those who decide to enter such relationships 
is specious.162 
 
 158. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1967) 
 159. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
 160. Id. 
 161. The selection of Windsor as a plaintiff to challenge the Defense of Marriage 
Act also indicates a strategic alliance with an ideal – here, a white person with signifi-
cant income – that would personally speak to the community of decisionmakers who 
could likely relate to the estate tax issue.  See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra 
note 112, at 522–23 (“Under the theory of interest convergence, Edith Windsor, a 
wealthy, white woman in a long-term committed relationship in New York City, was, 
in many ways, the perfect plaintiff to challenge DOMA because she could be sold as 
part of a respectable, assimilation-based gay image to the general public and, more 
importantly, to those in power.”).  Indeed, in other contexts too, narrative plays an im-
portant function in advocacy and legislative strategy and outcomes.  I have written 
about this previously in the immigration law and policy realm in Mariela Olivares, The 
Impact of Recessionary Politics on Latino-American and Immigrant Families: SCHIP 
Success and DREAM Act Failure, 55 HOW. L.J. 359 (2012); Olivares, Renewing the 
Dream, supra note 32; Mariela Olivares, Battered by Law: The Political Subordination 
of Immigrant Women, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 231 (2014) [hereinafter Olivares, Battered by 
Law]; and Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11. 
 162. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation omitted). 
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Although the majority in Obergefell likely does not intend to assert that unmar-
ried people are inferior to married couples or that children living in families 
with unmarried parents are always worse off than those children with married 
parents, by employing a narrative that elevates the marriage institution to a 
“noble,” “transcendent,” “profound” and “digni[fied]” state of being, the im-
plication of inferiority is strong.163  Moreover, the narrative choice diminishes 
to some degree the equality effect Obergefell has or could have for gay indi-
viduals generally.  By using language that places the demand for constitutional 
equality in the realm of couple-hood, it obfuscates the right of the gay individ-
ual to be treated equally despite his/her preference to marry. 
Further, the construct promoting marriage demotes all unmarried, di-
vorced or single people – gay or straight – to an apparent realm of loneliness.  
One commentator noted of the opinion’s focus on marriage: “Now all of us 
single people are pathetic, not just the straight ones.”164  Indeed, in 2014, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that for the first time since it began tracking 
such numbers, a majority of adult Americans – 50.2% or 124.6 million people 
– consider themselves “single.”165  The Pew Research Center similarly reported 
that “[i]n 2012, one-in-five adults ages 25 and older (about 42 million people) 
had never been married,” a historically high percentage of unmarried Ameri-
cans.166  In this regard, the Obergefell marriage rhetoric therefore speaks dis-
paragingly to millions of Americans.167 
Similarly, the language regarding the harm and humiliation that befalls 
children of unmarried parents may be surprising to the millions of families 
raising children outside of the traditional two-married parent construct.  One 
recent study indicates that in 2013, only 46% of children in the United States 
were living in a home with two married heterosexual parents in their first mar-
riage.168  Breaking down this data in various ways, the Pew Research Center 
 
 163. Id. at 2599–2602 (majority opinion). 
 164. Michael Cobb, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-
courts-lonely-hearts-club.html?_r=1. 
 165. Mythili Rao, Singles Now Outnumber Married People in America – and That’s 
a Good Thing, PRI (Sept. 14, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-
14/singles-now-outnumber-married-people-america-and-thats-good-thing (citing Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics data). 
 166. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Mar-
ried, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/rec-
ord-share-of-americans-have-never-married/. 
 167. See Cobb, supra note 164 (“The words and the value [the Obergefell marriage 
rhetoric] communicate are impossible to avoid, and often difficult to resist.  It’s as if 
the words of Justice Kennedy and my grandmother, who, on her deathbed, begged me 
to get married, have melded together in my head, declaring my life lacking . . . .”). 
 168. Gretchen Livingston, Fewer Than Half of U.S. Kids Today Live in a ‘Tradi-
tional’ Family, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/12/22/less-than-half-of-u-s-kids-today-live-in-a-traditional-family/. 
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study shows that roughly 34% of children were living in a home with an un-
married parent; 15% were living in a home with married parents at least one of 
which was not the first marriage; 4% of children were living with unmarried 
cohabitating parents; and 5% of children were living with neither parent.169  
The implication that these millions of children are living in undignified or in-
ferior families and that perhaps they should feel humiliation (if they do not 
already) because they live without married parents would likely come as a sur-
prise to many of them. 
The heteronormative preference narrative has far-reaching effects beyond 
the legal precedent of Obergefell and for civil rights advocacy strategies to 
come.  Levit discusses, for example, the ways in which ascription to the two-
heterosexual-parent norm negatively affects gay parents seeking to be foster 
parents or involved in child custody disputes.170  Courts, she reports, still find 
that gayness can be harmful to a child and thus penalize gay parents seeking 
custody.171  Similarly, single gay people seeking to become foster parents are 
perceived as less than ideal parents because they are not in a “committed, mo-
nogamous relationship.”172 
By relying on the marriage preference narrative as the ultimate heteronor-
mative model to convince the American public that same-sex couples should 
be entitled to the right to marry just like opposite-sex couples, Obergefell ex-
cludes those outside this constructed ideal.  The effects of the chosen narrative 
should not be ignored.  Indeed, the dependence on the heteronormative mar-
riage preference – a preference that is falling out of favor for millions of Amer-
icans – has concomitant demeaning effects on many other adults, children and 
families.  Or, as Levit concludes, “[H]eteronormativity has real world conse-
quences.”173 
Employing a chosen narrative in the immigration equality movement has 
similarly stark real-world consequences.  By painting the worthy immigrant in 
a very particular light, the effects on those outside the ideal go far beyond in-
ternalized feelings of otherness or humiliation.  Because the narrative affects 
legislative change that is remarkably stagnant – comprehensive immigration 
reform happens over decades, if that – and affects people’s literal ability to 
remain in the country, it behooves immigration equality advocates to be cau-
tious in their strategic maneuverings.  Part IV discusses the importance of the 
chosen strategic narrative, the paths that advocates have historically chosen and 
the ways in which those strategies have failed.  Part V then provides important 
guidance in crafting a narrative that achieves legislative and political success 
while diminishing the potential harmful effects on the community at large. 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Levit, Theorizing and Litigating, supra note 116, at 33–34. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 34. 
 173. Id. 
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IV.  THE IMMIGRANT NARRATIVE 
President Obama’s Administration deported more immigrants than any 
prior president in U.S. history.174  Despite statements of inclusion for immi-
grants, the reality is one of broad exclusion.  Where, then, do the rhetoric and 
reality diverge?  The answer lies in the criminal narrative ascribed to the im-
migrant identity. 
As I have previously asserted, the criminality narrative as applied to im-
migrants is a politically volatile strategy that has been effectively employed by 
both major political parties.175  Immigration and criminality have become in-
extricably linked in public and political media and discourse.  Legislators from 
both dominant political parties rely on the narrative of the criminal alien to 
distance themselves from reform and advocacy that may seem too soft on those 
who violate the immigration laws.  Senator and 2016 Republican presidential 
candidate Ted Cruz called for the immediate deportation of all undocumented 
immigrants, with seemingly no regard for due process or other constitutional 
and statutory protections, stating in one interview, “[Y]es, we should deport 
them [all undocumented immigrants].  We should build a wall, we should triple 
the Border Patrol.  Federal law requires that anyone here illegally that’s appre-
hended should be deported.”176  In a similar vein, to support his executive ac-
tions to provide deferred action to certain groups of undocumented immigrants, 
Obama noted that his immigration policies are about targeting “[f]elons, not 
families.  Criminals, not children.  Gang members, not a mom who’s working 
hard to provide for her kids.”177 
Both statements support a view of immigrants as criminal lawbreakers.  
While Obama’s emphasis on immigrants’ criminality or latent criminality is 
powerful enough, others cast a criminal character on simply the act of being an 
 
 174. See, e.g., Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People Than Any 
Other President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Poli-
tics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661 (“According to govern-
mental data, the Obama administration has deported more people than any other presi-
dent’s administration in history.  In fact, they have deported more than the sum of all 
the presidents of the 20th century.”).     
 175. See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 992–93.  
 176. Victor Morton, Ted Cruz Toughens Immigration Stance, Says He’d Deport All 
Illegals, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2016/feb/22/ted-cruz-says-hed-deport-all-illegal-immigrants-us/. 
 177. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the Presi-
dent in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-
address-nation-immigration.  Obama has otherwise spoken in terms of “good” versus 
“bad” immigrants.  See Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow 
Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-
shows.html?_r=0 (discussing the high number of deportations in the years of the Obama 
administration and stating that though Obama claimed to be deporting gang members 
and other criminals, that is not actually the case). 
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undocumented immigrant.  Cruz incorrectly asserts that presence equates to 
criminality, even though a person’s lawful or unlawful status can only ulti-
mately be determined through an immigration adjudication.178  This typical 
(though legally inaccurate) rhetoric that confuses criminality with immigrant 
status is bolstered by Obama’s familiar yet faulty assertion that some immi-
grants are worthy of relief while others are not.179 
Despite the popular perception that typecasts immigrants as rule-breakers, 
research has routinely shown that immigrants do not commit crime at a higher 
rate than U.S. citizens,180 bucking the myth that status as an immigrant some-
how correlates to a criminal nature or propensity.181  The consequences of us-
ing this false corollary go far beyond the philosophical, however, and have 
critical effects on individuals and families every day.  Legislative or political 
reform that increases criminal effects on immigrants or expands the deportable 
offenses due to criminal conduct, or even perceived criminality as some have 
 
 178. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) (“As a general rule, it 
is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the 
Need for New Narratives in the U.S.  Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 
221–22 (2012) (describing how the narrative of criminality and victimhood benefits 
certain immigrants (the perceived victims) and inordinately targets others (the per-
ceived criminals) without suitable discretion for complexities); see also Olivares, Re-
newing the Dream, supra note 32, at 88–98 (showing that advocates for DREAM Act-
type legislation historically fell victim to the problems inherent in the narrative di-
lemma of good versus bad immigrant). 
 180. See WALTER A. EWING, DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2015), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_crimi-
nalization_of_immigration_in_the_united_states.pdf (surveying the data and showing: 
“[E]vidence that immigrants tend not to be criminals is overwhelming . . . . Crime rates 
in the United States have trended downward for many years at the same time that the 
number of immigrants has grown.  Second, immigrants are less likely to be incarcerated 
than the native-born.  And, third, immigrants are less likely than the native-born to 
engage in the criminal behaviors that tend to land one in prison”); see also César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, The Perverse Logic of Immigration Detention: Unrav-
eling the Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants Based on Markers of Race and Class 
Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 353, 362 (2012) (citing Ramiro Martínez, Jr., Com-
ing to America: The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime, in IMMIGRATION AND 
CRIME: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENCE 1, 10–12 (Ramiro Martínez, Jr. & Abel 
Valenzuela, Jr. eds., 2006)) (noting evidence indicating that immigrants are actually 
less prone to criminal behavior than U.S. citizens); Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, 
Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, 
and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. 
REV. 583, 592 (2010) (citing KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY 
AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 155–58 (2007)). 
 181. See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 993–95 & 
nn.143–60. 
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offered, would result in many more deportations.182  As history teaches, immi-
gration reform does not happen quickly; if a new restrictive law is imple-
mented, it will have immediate and possibly generations-long effects on mil-
lions of immigrants and their families.  Such a consequence is arguably even 
more severe than that which was at stake in the marriage equality fight (i.e., 
the denial of the fundamental right to marry versus the forcible removal from 
one’s family and community to another country).  Importantly, then, immigra-
tion advocates must vehemently and urgently work towards changing the dom-
inant narrative to stop pervasive and restrictive measures before they are en-
acted – rather than be forced to fight for their repeal after immigrants and their 
communities have borne the destructive effects. 
Critically, however, the narrative reframing must employ a new strategy, 
as previous efforts were not successful or are no longer viable in the current 
anti-immigrant climate.  For example, as I have previously written, one popular 
narrative regarding the innocence or vulnerability of certain immigrants – most 
commonly typified as children who had no choice in being brought to the 
United States – consistently failed to pass the DREAM Act despite historical 
bi-partisan support since its initial congressional introduction in 2001.183  More 
 
 182. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“[T]he 
[DHS] . . . shall prioritize for removal those aliens . . . who . . . [h]ave been convicted 
of any criminal offense . . . charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has 
not been resolved [or] have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense 
. . . .”); see also Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
to DHS Leadership 2–3 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publi-
cations/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-
Interest.pdf (directing ICE, CBP and USCIS to “issue further guidance to allocate ap-
propriate resources” for these priorities).  Angélica Cházaro has written poignantly 
about the critical effects of governmental and executive prioritization of “criminal” or 
“dangerous” aliens for deportation and the severe consequences these policies bring to 
immigrants caught in the narrative crossfire: “[P]ushing for reforms that would focus 
enforcement on so-called dangerous criminals instead of innocent immigrants exempts 
immigration enforcement practices from critique by making them isolatable to so-
called real immigrant criminality.  This ends up shoring up both the criminal alien cat-
egory and the problems with the criminal justice system itself.”  Angélica Cházaro, 
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 653–54 (2016). 
 183. See Olivares, Renewing the Dream, supra note 32, at 87–88.  Importantly, 
though, this ascription to the innocence and vulnerability of children relies in part upon 
the vilification of the immigrant parents who unlawfully crossed the border, a conse-
quence that is not lost on some immigration advocates.  See, e.g., Marcela Valdes, Is It 
Possible to Resist Deportation in Trump’s America?, NY TIMES (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/magazine/is-it-possible-to-resist-deportation-
in-trumps-america.html (interviewing immigrant advocates regarding the effects of the 
DREAM Act narratives: “[One interviewee] was irritated by the Dreamers’ tendency 
to portray themselves as innocent victims, a tactic that opened the door for conserva-
tives to speak of Dreamers with empathy even as they cracked down on their parents 
as ‘criminals.’ . . . ‘A lot of us feel like we sort of shot ourselves in the foot,’ Erika 
Andiola, [Arizona Dream Act Coalition’s first president, said] . . . ‘Because we started 
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recently, the same strategy achieved a small measure of traction in calling at-
tention to the plight of thousands of Central American mothers and children 
seeking asylum but who are instead jailed in detention centers upon their arrival 
in the United States.184 
In 2016, advocates intensified their efforts to end family detention, result-
ing in a federal court blocking the continued licensure of two Texas family 
detention facilities, effectively creating a roadblock (but not a complete halt) 
to the family detention regime.185  This move came during other Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) efforts to review its immigrant detention prac-
tices.186  In 2015 and 2016, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson convened two separate 
committees of immigration experts to review (1) the ICE use of private prison 
businesses to build and operate immigration detention centers187 and (2) the 
ICE practice of detaining families.188  The committee ultimately divided on the 
continued ICE use of private prison facilities to house immigrants, drawing a 
strong dissent from a majority of the committee members who disputed the 
report’s conclusion that reliance on private prisons is inevitable.189  Similarly, 
 
that narrative like, “I was brought here by my parents, not my fault, poor me, I was here 
as a child” that kind of created blamed on our parents.’”). 
 184. See, e.g., Letter from Cong. of the U.S., House of Representatives to Jeh John-
son, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 27, 2015), https://lofgren.house.gov/up-
loadedfiles/family_detention.pdf (expressing concern about the practice of detaining 
immigrant mothers and children in “jail-like” facilities). 
 185. Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 
D-1-GN-15-004336 (Travis Cty. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2016); see also Breaking: Texas 
Court Blocks Licensing of Family Detention Camps as Childcare Facilities, 
GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Dec. 3, 2016), http://grassrootsleadership.org/re-
leases/2016/12/breaking-texas-court-blocks-licensing-family-detention-camps-child-
care-facilities (describing the outcome of the litigation). 
 186. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec’y Jeh C. 
Johnson on Establishing a Review of Privatized Immigration Detention (Aug. 29, 
2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/08/29/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-es-
tablishing-review-privatized-immigration (stating that the subcommittee of the Home-
land Security Advisory Council should “review our current policy and practices con-
cerning the use of private immigration detention and evaluate whether this practice 
should be eliminated”). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec’y Jeh C. John-
son on Family Residential Ctrs. (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-resi-
dential-centers (stating that “I have reached the conclusion that we must make substan-
tial changes in our detention practices with respect to families with children.  In short, 
once a family has established eligibility for asylum or other relief under our laws, long-
term detention is an inefficient use of our resources and should be discontinued”).  As 
one part of this so-called effort to change or halt this practice, the DHS created the 
Federal Advisory Committee.  See id. 
 189. See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (2016), 
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the committee that was convened to review family detention practices pro-
duced a comprehensive report but ultimately concluded: “DHS’s immigration 
enforcement practices should operationalize the presumption that detention is 
generally neither appropriate nor necessary for families – and that detention or 
the separation of families for purposes of immigration enforcement or manage-
ment, or detention is never in the best interest of children.”190 
The focus on the plight of immigrant children and families to advocate 
more broadly for immigrant rights and equality was, in many ways, a sound 
strategic decision.  When politicians and other constituencies who are not typ-
ically allied with immigration rights advocates understood the realities of chil-
dren and family detention, changes to the policies became possible.191  The 
strategy of equating immigrant detention with the practice of jailing children is 
akin to the tactical decision of choosing certain sympathetic plaintiffs in the 
marriage equality fight.192  Nancy Levit discusses how presenting a counter-
narrative in the gay-rights movement helped to humanize gay people to the 
heteronormative majority: “Telling counterstories is a way to challenge domi-
nant narratives . . . . Stories introduce the humans whose rights are being liti-
gated, and the personal narratives tell how it feels to experience domination or 
discrimination.”193  Similarly, when the majority politic was confronted with 
the reality that the U.S. government imprisons mothers and children with no 
criminal history, response and action ensued.194  Thus, transforming the narra-
tive in a normative context – from morally-corrupt gay outsider to grieving 
widower or American military veteran in the Obergefell case and from illegal 
alien criminal invader to infants and children behind barbed wire fences – helps 
the advocate converge the fight for equality with the reality of the majority, 
often to legislative and political success.195 
 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/DHS%20HSAC%20PIDF%20Final%20Report.pdf.  The dissenters to the Re-
port’s “Recommendation 1,” which described a continued reliance on private prison for 
immigration detention as fiscally inevitable, state that without a “meaningful determi-
nation on the best detention model in light of all relevant factors [including] . . . . the 
most effective and humane approach to civil detention . . . .  I cannot, in good con-
science, agree that status quo reliance on the continuation of the private detention model 
is warranted or appropriate.”  See id. at 11 n.14. 
 190. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 2 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf. 
 191. See Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 991 & n. 
139; (discussing the political and activist alliances that were created because of the 
children immigrant crisis in 2013–2015). 
 192. See supra notes 136 –144, 158–161 and accompanying text.  
 193. Levit, Theorizing and Litigating, supra note 116, at 41. 
 194. Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 991. 
 195. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text; Olivares, Intersectionality 
at the Intersection, supra note 11, at 991–99 (alluding to the narrative strategy in the 
family detention context as it pertains to the powerful identity politics surrounding im-
migrant rights).  This strategy harkens strongly to the iconic work of Derrick Bell, who 
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To be sure, the efforts to focus on the injustices of family detention on the 
most vulnerable among us – mothers and children – secured some measures of 
success, including the Texas injunction, the DHS committee conclusions, and 
the eventual release of some families from family detention.196  Yet, these suc-
cesses should not diminish the facts that the U.S. government continues to de-
tain families and continues to rely on the immigration detention regime to im-
prison women, children and men, a majority of whom have no record of serious 
criminality.197  In the end, then, the narrative reliance on the vulnerability of 
women and children achieved incomplete success, and any public empathy to-
wards this community has largely turned to apathy.198  
The need to reframe the narrative framework is not limited to the immi-
gration equality fight and is a hallmark of civil rights strategic advocacy.  As 
Mary Bernstein writes regarding the different identity strategies utilized at dif-
ferent times within an equality rights movement: 
Movements employ innovative direct action tactics at various points 
throughout their life cycle, not just when they are emerging.  Such ac-
tion can be internally or externally directed, depending on the type of 
 
cautioned about the fealty to a reliance on an interest convergence strategy in the on-
going struggle for racial equality because “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites . . . 
. [but] will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks 
where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class 
whites.”  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver-
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).  I discuss more about this connec-
tion below. 
 196. Elise Foley & Roque Planas, Hundreds of Immigrant Moms and Kids Freed 
from Detention After Texas Court Ruling, HUFFPOST (Dec. 5, 2016, 5:59 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/immigrant-family-detention-
texas_us_5845a6d0e4b028b3233877c9 (noting that hundreds of women and children 
were released from two Texas family detention centers after the Texas court enjoined 
the licensure of the two centers, though prison industry officials denied the correlation 
of the two events); see also Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 
11, at 1005 (discussing the narrative strategy employed in the fight to end family de-
tention). 
 197. See, e.g., Lauren Etter, Record Numbers of Undocumented Immigrants Being 
Detained in U.S., BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-11-10/record-numbers-of-undocumented-immigrants-
being-detained-in-u-s.  Former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Jeh 
Johnson reported that 41,000 immigrants were being held in immigration detention fa-
cilities, “up from a ‘typical’ number of between 31,000 and 34,000.”  Id.  The total 
number of apprehensions at the border by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection also 
increased twenty-three percent from the previous year to almost 409,000.  Id. 
 198. A common thread among the various narrative strategies that have been em-
ployed is that they are incomplete and often result in a collateral “othering” of those 
outside the revered group.  See, e.g., Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, su-
pra note 11.  In my next article, I will explore the viability of a renewed strategic frame-
work that capitalizes upon the current socio-political resistance movement.  
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movement organizations, level of political access, and the extent of op-
position . . . . [W]e should focus on explaining the structural relationship 
between identity and mobilization, when identity is a goal of collective 
action, and under what political conditions activists either deploy edu-
cational or critical identities or avoid identity strategies altogether.199 
Though Bernstein writes here in 1997 about the gay rights movement, her 
words are prescient and informative for the immigrant equality rights struggle.  
The tactic must shift with changing times and in recognition that past efforts 
have resulted in incomplete successes.  Part V discusses these alternatives 
while cautioning against the divisiveness that often accompanies narrative 
strategy. 
V.  CHALLENGING THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
In Faces at the Bottom of the Well, one of his groundbreaking works out-
lining interest convergence theory, Derrick Bell wrote: 
When whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least cost-free to 
serve, hire, admit, or otherwise deal with blacks on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, they do so.  When they fear – accurately or not – that there may 
be a loss, inconvenience, or upset to themselves or other whites, dis-
criminatory conduct usually follows. . . .  
. . . .  
Racial policy is the culmination of thousands of these individual 
practices.  Black people, then, are caught in a double bind.  We are, as 
I have said, disadvantaged unless whites perceive that nondiscrimina-
tory treatment for us will be a benefit for them.  In addition, even when 
nonracist practices might bring a benefit, whites may rely on discrimi-
nation against blacks as a unifying factor and a safety valve for frustra-
tions during economic hard times.200 
 
 199. Bernstein, supra note 154, at 560–61 (asserting the strategic path of the gay 
rights moment as one involving numerous reframing opportunities in response to 
changing political climates). 
 200. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 7 (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM].  Bell also summarized the 
theory: 
 
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown [v. 
Board of Education], this principle of “interest convergence” provides: The in-
terest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites.  However, the fourteenth amendment, 
standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial 
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The lesson, then, is that equality movements succeed only when the equal 
rights of the oppressed, vulnerable and subordinated coincide with the interests 
of the dominant political majority.  As Bell notes, interest convergence theory 
has been proven ad nauseam in the context of black and other racial and ethnic 
minorities’ struggles to achieve legal and societal equality.201 
Kimberlé Crenshaw explored the theory in her 1998 article that rings in-
credibly poignant today.  In discussing corollary critical race conceptions of 
antidiscrimination legislation in the context of employment laws, she notes 
that, in one view: 
[E]ven when injustice is found, efforts to redress it must be balanced 
against, and limited by, competing interests of white workers – even 
when those interests were actually created by the subordination of 
Blacks.  The innocence of whites weighs more heavily than do the past 
wrongs committed upon Blacks and the benefits that whites derived 
from those wrongs . . . . [This] view seeks to proscribe only certain 
kinds of subordinating acts, and then only when other interests are not 
overly burdened.202 
Thus, knowing that civil rights equality is only possible when such change 
aligns with the interest of the political majority (namely, the heterosexual up-
per-income white person), the discourse has often embraced the normative 
rhetoric to effectuate change, as in the same-sex marriage equality move-
ment.203  But, as discussed above, difficulties emerge because the attachment 
to the normative framework necessarily excludes those outside of that domi-
nate narrative, either through ostracizing tactics or by the external community’s 
choice not to comport with the norms (e.g., gay people who choose not to 
marry; co-parents who raise children outside of marriage).204  Herein lies the 
 
equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal sta-
tus of middle and upper class whites. 
 
Bell, supra note 195, at 523. 
 201.  BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 200, at 10 (discussing the scape-
goating by whites of blacks and the foundational component that racism has in a suc-
cessful democracy, “The permanence of this ‘symbiosis’ ensures that civil rights gains 
will be temporary and setbacks inevitable.  Consider: In this last decade of the twentieth 
century, color determines the social and economic status of African Americans, both 
those who have been highly successful and their poverty-bound brethren whose lives 
are grounded in misery and despair”). 
 202. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1342 
(1988) (footnote omitted). 
 203. See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 526–27 (discussing 
this phenomenon); Chang, supra note 124, at 22–23 (same). 
 204. See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 536–37; Chang, supra 
note 124, at 27–28; Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 875–77 
(discussing the othering effect). 
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critical obstacle in crafting an inclusive and not otherwise harmful political 
narrative that effectuates practical legal reform.  Specifically, how does the 
immigrant rights advocate confronted with a system engrained in interest con-
vergence effectuate change while maintaining inclusivity and not demonizing 
a broad sector of the immigrant community? 
Analogies can be drawn once again to the marriage equality and gay rights 
movement, where scholars and activists have made similar calls for inclusive-
ness.  Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, for example, appeal for a renewed 
gay rights movement that is significantly more inclusive and diverse in various 
ways – race, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.205  They assert that political 
and popular culture must be diversified so as to not rely on whiteness as a nor-
malizing tactic, stating: “It is crucial that the gay rights movement reject color-
blindness as a solution to the racialized problems that need to be addressed 
within the community, particularly given the unspoken role that white privilege 
or interest convergence is acknowledged as playing in the movement’s suc-
cesses.”206  To this point, too, Levit argues that a reimagined gay rights move-
ment should focus less on ascribing to normative ideals and rather embrace an 
approach grounded in humanizing gay people in a broader sense while still 
incorporating the uniqueness of community members.207  She writes: “Human-
ization . . .  does not require homogenization.  Efforts toward humanization 
must include changing the cultural re-presentations of sexual minorities.  This 
necessitates increasing visibility, combating untrue media representations, and 
replacing the dominant cultural images with more accurate portrayals of the 
lived experiences of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals.”208  The focus 
of both suggestions, then, is one of breadth – emphasizing our common hu-
manity, while also including various representations of the subordinated pop-
ulation to highlight its diversity, would move away from relying upon a nor-
mative ideal. 
Yet, the normalizing strategies in parallel civil rights movements that 
proved successful – like that in the marriage equality fight – seem ill-fitting for 
a revised immigrant equality tactic.  As discussed above regarding the legal 
and political struggle to keep mothers and children out of immigration deten-
tion, immigrant advocates have achieved minimal successes with efforts to 
broadly humanize the immigrant experience.  One example of a convergent 
narrative that plays to a normative framework is from the efforts to pass the 
DREAM Act.209  In that strategy, immigrant rights advocates champion the 
“best and brightest” – those young immigrants who could provide great bene-
fits to the United States by their educational attainment or military service.  
According to this advocacy theory, these positive attributes appeal to politi-
 
 205. See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 112, at 544–46. 
 206. Id. at 545. 
 207. Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness, supra note 120, at 931. 
 208.  Id. 
 209. See generally Olivares, Renewing the Dream, supra note 32. 
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cians and to the larger society.  Although this strategy would necessarily ex-
clude a majority of the immigrant population – because most people are not the 
class valedictorian, a gifted scientist in training, or an eager military recruit – 
the effort could at least open the door to positive immigration results for some 
and perhaps even lead to later more inclusive immigration reform efforts.210  
But just as the humanizing strategy highlighting women and children immi-
grants housed in detention had only some measure of success, the reification 
of the “best and brightest” has not worked, as evidenced by the numerous un-
successful efforts to pass the DREAM Act.  The deeply-ingrained identity pol-
itics that color immigrants have thus far proven too powerful to overcome.211 
Bell’s words regarding the overwhelming power of interest convergence 
are fitting for the plight of the immigrant in the United States.  He wrote: 
The fact is that, despite what we designate as progress wrought through 
struggle over many generations, we remain what we were in the begin-
ning: a dark and foreign presence, always the designated “other.”  Tol-
erated in good times, despised when things go wrong, as a people we 
are scapegoated and sacrificed as distraction or catalyst for compromise 
to facilitate resolution of political differences or relieve economic ad-
versity.212 
American history provides abundant examples of societal tolerance towards 
immigrants, especially immigrants of color, when cheap, expendable labor is 
needed.  Chinese workers in the early to mid-1800s were imported during times 
of labor shortages, only to be ostracized and eventually forcibly removed at the 
time of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.213  Mexican Braceros were re-
cruited from rural Mexico to perform difficult agricultural labor, only to be 
repatriated at the end of the Bracero program.214  And in contemporary times, 
immigrant labor continues to fuel American demands for inexpensive products 
but is also vehemently targeted as the source of economic insecurity and crim-
inality. 215 
 
 210. See id. at 123 (discussing the strategy that refocuses the advocacy because “a 
broad-scale, comprehensive immigration reform movement that grants all or most un-
documented immigrant children lawful status is not currently politically feasible.  Ra-
ther than continue to bemoan the lack of movement on the DREAM Act, advocates and 
supporters should attempt change in achievable small steps, with an eye towards ex-
panding the benefits in a friendlier political climate”). 
 211.  See id. at 114–15; Olivares, Battered by Law, supra note 161, at 262–63 (dis-
cussing the identity politics that stymied legislative reform for battered immigrants). 
 212. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 200, at 10. 
 213. See supra Part II.  
 214. See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.  
 215. Maryland’s crab industry, for example, relies on immigrants on H2-B visas for 
crab picking jobs to meet the “strong demand for Maryland crab meat” because “there 
are not enough [American citizens] who are trained or want to do them.”  Mike 
Hellgren, Immigration Crackdown Worries Maryland’s Crab Industry, CBS BALT. 
(Feb. 22, 2017, 11:10 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/02/22/immigration-
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A renewed strategy for achieving immigrant rights and justice must move 
in a different direction.  At bottom, advocates must recognize the limitations 
inherent in past efforts.  Crenshaw’s assertions on the limitations of traditional 
civil rights reform prove instructive.  She writes:  
The danger of adopting equal opportunity rhetoric on its face is that the 
constituency incorporates legal and philosophical concepts that have an 
uneven history and an unpredictable trajectory.  If the civil rights con-
stituency allows its own political consciousness to be completely re-
placed by the ambiguous discourse of antidiscrimination law, it will be 
difficult for it to defend its genuine interests against those whose inter-
ests are supported by opposing visions that also lie within the same dis-
course.  The struggle, it seems, is to maintain a contextualized, specified 
world view that reflects the experience of Blacks.  The question remains 
whether engaging in legal reform precludes this possibility.216 
Similarly, couching immigration activism in a traditional litigation and protest 
framework will not sustain justice goals when the normative view does not 
include immigrants as worthy.  As long as immigrants remain outsiders and 
their interests do not adequately converge with the interests of the majority 
while purportedly straining common resources, traditional reform frameworks 
are futile.  As Crenshaw concludes: 
By accepting the bounds of law and ordering their lives according to its 
categories and relations, people think that they are confirming reality – 
the way things must be.  Yet by accepting the view of the world implicit 
in the law, people are also bound by its conceptual limitations.  Thus 
conflict and antagonism are contained: the legitimacy of the entire order 
is never seriously questioned.217 
In short, our first step is accepting the inherent interest convergence dilemma 
and the limitations of the law as it applies to the immigrant whose identity 
cannot be adequately and completely ascribed in any quick politically viable 
narrative due to the illegitimacy of the present system. 
 
crackdown-worries-marylands-crab-industry/ (“Crab processors fear the heated climate 
over immigration could impact a legal visa program that brings in crab pickers from 
Mexico.”).  Yet, the anti-immigration movement and its references to criminality con-
tinue to push for restrictive immigration laws for the “public safety and welfare of Mar-
yland residents and visitors.”  See, e.g., Fair Staff, Stop Sanctuary Policies in Mary-
land!, IMMIGRATIONREFORM.COM (Mar. 3, 2016), http://immigrationre-
form.com/2016/03/03/support-immigration-enforcement-in-maryland/. 
 216. Crenshaw, supra note 202, at 1349 (footnote omitted). 
 217. Id. at 1352. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
What, then, is a politically viable narrative that would lead to immigrant 
equality?  Lawyers, activists and immigrants have lobbied, petitioned, pro-
tested and litigated for decades only to find ourselves in a vicious anti-immi-
grant political environment.  Yet, this same environment has created an encour-
aging counter-movement.  Indeed, perhaps nothing has galvanized a larger po-
litical constituency eager to support immigrant equality than the election of 
Trump to the presidency.  One day after his inauguration, an estimated 3.2 mil-
lion people rallied in Washington, D.C. and cities around the United States to 
support women’s rights and equality for other marginalized populations, in-
cluding immigrants and refugees.218  In his first month in office, President 
Trump issued various Executive Orders that significantly targeted immigrants 
and refugees, especially people from seven countries with predominately Mus-
lim populations.219  The fervent pushback against these measures was immedi-
ate and included additional rallies; outspoken and public critique; and a surge 
 
 218. There were many more marches and rallies around the world.  Sister Marches, 
WOMEN’S MARCH, https://www.womensmarch.com/sisters (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) 
(showing 673 marches registered around the world); see also Pictures from Women’s 
Marches on Every Continent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2017/01/21/world/womens-march-pictures.html?_r=0.  The 
U.S.-wide estimate is based on a “relatively cautious” meta-analysis conducted by the 
reputable poll aggregation website, FiveThirtyEight.  See Nate Silver, The Long March 
Ahead For Democrats: What Saturday’s Women’s Marches Tell Us About the Party’s 
Path Back to Power, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:59 AM), http://fivethir-
tyeight.com/features/the-long-march-ahead-for-democrats/ (listing estimates and 
methodology by city: Washington, D.C., 485,000; Los Angeles, 450,000; New York, 
400,000; Boston, 175,000; Chicago, 150,000; Seattle, 120,000; St. Paul, Minn., Den-
ver, Colo., Madison, Wis., San Francisco, Cal., Portland, Or., Oakland, Cal., Atlanta, 
Ga., and Philadelphia, Pa., between 50,000 and 95,000).  The focus of the rallies, 
marches and public gatherings was to support women’s rights, immigrants and refugee 
protections and to show solidarity with other marginalized communities.  See Unity 
Principles, WOMEN’S MARCH, https://www.womensmarch.com/principles/ (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2018) (showing that two of the eight unifying causes of the organizers were 
women’s reproductive rights and immigrant rights). 
 219. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (ordering the cre-
ation of a “contiguous, physical wall” along the U.S.-Mexico border); Exec. Order No. 
13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (pledging the hire of 10,000 more immigra-
tion officers and revoking federal grant money from so-called “sanctuary cities,” which 
refuse to deport undocumented immigrants); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (suspending the U.S. refugee program for 120 days, indefinitely 
banning Syrian refugees and banning anyone arriving to the United States from seven 
Muslim-majority countries), revoked by Exec. Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 
6, 2017).  On March 6, 2017, Executive Order No. 13,769 was amended by Executive 
Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209.  Among other things, the new Order banned na-
tionals from six Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States for ninety 
days and banned all refugees from entering the United States for 120 days.  Exec. Order 
49
Olivares: Narrative Reform Dilemmas
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
1138 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
in monetary donations to organizations working against the measures.220  
Though public outcries against injustice towards immigrants (and others) is not 
novel, the magnitude and volume of the early 2017 demonstrations make it 
unique. Leaders in the immigrant justice movement should capitalize on this 
galvanizing moment, while acknowledging the interest convergence reality, to 
craft a narrative that captures this populist support for equality. 
There is formidable opposition to any reform that supports and/or benefits 
immigrants.  Trump won the presidency in part by blaming immigrants for per-
ceived economic woes and security concerns, stoking fear and uncovering both 
unconscious and explicit bias among Americans.221  As one writer cautions, 
“[Advocates for immigrants] can’t ignore that or underestimate it.  National 
angst is real.”222  A successful strategy, then, recognizes this angst and the di-
visiveness that accusatory, heated debate fuels.  While a renewed narrative 
should neither concede the limitations of the illegitimate system nor normalize 
hate, a successful strategy must acknowledge the opposition and respond in a 
manner that will ultimately lead to successful reform – at times working with 
 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).  The Order was challenged in federal dis-
trict courts around the country and eventually gained the attention of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The Court ultimately granted petitions for certiorari in addition to upholding the 
Order as it applied to the exclusion of refugees.  Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) (per curiam).  The Court noted one exception to 
the refugee ban, in which “[a]n American individual or entity that has a bona fide rela-
tionship with a particular person seeking to enter the country as a refugee.”  Id. at 2089.  
In October 2017, the Court dismissed an appeal of the March Executive Order, and two 
federal courts granted preliminary injunctions against allowing certain provisions of 
the September Executive Order to go into effect.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 
(2017); see also Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. 
Md. 2017); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw.), aff'd in part, vacated in 
part sub nom., No. 17-17168, 2017 WL 6554184 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017). 
 220. See Lauren Gambino et al., Thousands Protest Against Trump Travel Ban in 
Cities and Airports Nationwide, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:01), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/29/protest-trump-travel-ban-mus-
lims-airports (detailing protests that erupted across the country at airports in New York, 
D.C., Dallas, Detroit, and Miami, as well as protests on the streets of New York and 
D.C.); Press Release, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, AILA: President’s Border and 
Immigration Enf’t Policies Will Undermine Rights and Weaken Pub. Safety (Jan. 25, 
2017), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2017/presidents-border-and-im-
migration-enforcement (criticizing the executive orders targeting immigrants and refu-
gees as “fundamentally contrary to the principles on which the American immigration 
system is based”); Liam Stack, Donations to A.C.L.U. and Other Organizations Surge 
After Trump’s Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/01/30/us/aclu-fund-raising-trump-travel-ban.html (reporting that 
ACLU raised $24 million dollars in one weekend, as compared to $3.5 million in all of 
2015). 
 221. Linda Valdez, Opinion, Think Twice Before Protesting ‘Trump Regime’ on 
Immigration, AZ CENT. (Jan. 9, 2017, 6:09 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opin-
ion/op-ed/lindavaldez/2017/01/06/trump-immigration-protest/96215650/.  
 222.  Id. 
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opponents; at other times, fighting against illegal or unjust propositions.  For 
the thousands of immigrants awaiting their fate in immigration detention or 
living in constant fear of deportation – or for the refugees losing hope in war-
torn countries or desperate camps – political debate for the sake of mere word-
play is an impractical and useless endeavor.  Past immigrant equality narratives 
are ineffective and outdated.  The challenge lies in crafting the story that will 
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